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THE ROAD TO PARIS RUNS THROUGH DELAWARE:  





As political and regulatory battles over climate change rage in the 
United States, and the Trump Administration unwinds regulation on 
climate change, the directors of some of the largest fossil fuel 
corporations, often referred to as “carbon-majors,” are facing a barrage 
of climate litigation claims. This is the second time directors of these 
corporations have faced litigation. The first wave of litigation against 
carbon majors failed for a number of reasons, including judicial 
reluctance to engage with the complex issue of climate change. However, 
climate litigation is evolving. In this second wave of litigation, judges have 
started to engage more directly with new scientific processes that link 
specific industry polluters to global climate impacts. Litigants are also 
becoming more creative, attempting to avoid federal displacement 
arguments encountered in the first wave by focusing on state-based 
common law and statutory claims. The number and scope of claims have 
also increased, with litigants moving beyond tort-based claims to employ 
diverse causes of action, including ones arising under corporate law. This 
second wave of litigation will have two implications for corporate law 
directors’ duties. First, the litigation highlights the bidirectional nature of 
climate impacts and risks. Corporations contribute emissions to the 
atmosphere, which increase the severity of climate-related impacts. Those 
impacts, in turn, pose significant risks to corporations themselves. Second, 
the litigation elevates the risk profile of climate change from an ethical 
concern to a significant financial risk that directors are legally obligated 
to consider in order to comply with their directors’ duties under current 
corporate law doctrine. This broad but sudden shift in litigation trends 
changes the risk equation for directors with respect to climate change. 
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Climate change has become the defining issue of this generation. Scientific 
assessments have become more and more definitive regarding anthropogenic 
climate change and the severity of its impacts.1 The window to avoid runaway 
                                                   
1 See LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
[IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger eds., 
2008), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/6SCF-4M4B] (“There is very high confidence that the net effect of human activities 
since 1750 has been one of warming.”); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
[IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2, 4, 8 
(2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AV2R-87QJ] (providing a report on a number of environmental factors 
including: atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide [being] 
unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years;” “[w]arming of the climate system is 
unequivocal;” and “[c]ontinued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming 
and long-lasting changes . . . increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible 
impacts for people and ecosystems.”), [hereinafter IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014]; Kendra 
Pierre-Louis, Ocean Warming Is Accelerating Faster Than Thought, New Research Finds, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/climate/ocean-warming-
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climate change is closing quickly.2 In 2015, almost 200 countries made 
commitments under the Paris Agreement in relation to climate change.3  
The United States was a largely progressive actor in the Paris Agreement 
negotiations.4 The subsequent change in administration has reversed the course of 
the United States in relation to climate change, with President Trump submitting a 
notice to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement and unwinding 
domestic regulation and policies on climate change.5 Perhaps due to this regulatory 
                                                   
climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/YW28-DZDW] (“[T]he world’s oceans are warming 
far more quickly than previously thought . . . .”); Brett Molina, ‘Dangerous’ Antarctic 
Glacier Has a Hole Roughly Two-Thirds Area of Manhattan, Scientists Warn, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 31, 2019, 7:38 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2019/01/31/thwaites-
glacier-antarctica-melting-could-impact-sea-levels-nasa/2729840002/ [https://perma.cc/G3 
R6-3ZAU] (“Thwaites has been described as one of the world’s most dangerous glaciers 
because its demise could lead to rapid changes in global sea levels.”); Mario Picazo, Ocean 
Heat Waves Are Becoming More Severe and Frequent, WEATHER NETWORK (Mar. 12, 2019, 
3:14 PM), https://www.theweathernetwork.com/ca/news/article/ocean-heatwaves-
becoming-more-frequent-severe-scientists-say-kelp-krill [https://perma.cc/2UWK-KTC8] 
(“Earth’s atmosphere has been getting warmer over the past century, [and] our oceans have 
also shown signs of unprecedented warming . . . .”).  
2 See Myles Allen et al., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], 
Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT 12 
(V. Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019 
/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B8Q-GK4D] (stating that in 
order to have a reasonable chance of not exceeding a 1.5˚C temperature increase, emissions 
must decrease by “45% from 2010 levels by 2030”). 
3 See generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/2015/L.9.Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) (agreeing “to hold the 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2˚C”). 
4 Karl Mathieson & Fiona Harvey, Climate Coalition Breaks Cover in Paris to Push 
for Binding and Ambitious Deal, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015, 3:19 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/08/coalition-paris-push-for-binding-
ambitious-climate-change-deal [https://perma.cc/5X55-PBHT] (finding the United States 
formed part of the “high ambition coalition” which pushed for including the 1.5˚C 
aspirational temperature goal).  
5 See Chris Wold, Climate Change, Presidential Power, and Leadership: “We Can’t 
Wait,” 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 303, 304–07 (2012) (noting that even though the Obama 
Administration demonstrated some progressive action on climate change, the issue was not 
pursued with sufficient urgency and the action that was taken was done primarily through 
executive action which is vulnerable to changing administrations); Juliet Eilperin, Trump 
Administration Proposes Rule to Relax Carbon Limits on Power Plants, WASH. POST (Aug. 
21, 2018, 8:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/trump-
administration-proposes-rule-to-relax-carbon-limits-on-power-plants/2018/08/21/b46b0a8a 
-a543-11e8-a656-943eefab5daf_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 2N5N-2LZL] (explaining that 
the current administration has been undoing previous regulatory progress on climate change); 
Valerie Volcovici, U.S. Submits Formal Notice of Withdrawal from Paris Climate Pact, 
REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017, 3:25), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-paris/u-s-
submits-formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-pact-idUSKBN1AK2FM [https:// 
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void, the battle around climate change has shifted to the courts, and this shift has 
important implications for directors of fossil fuel-intensive (or carbon-major) 
corporations.6  
Carbon-major corporations have faced a deluge of claims in recent years. Cities 
and municipalities from around the United States, including New York City,7 
Oakland and San Francisco,8 San Mateo,9 Marin County,10 City of Imperial Beach,11 
                                                   
perma.cc/P5VD-LD3E] (reporting on the State Department informing the United Nations 
that the United States will withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement); Edward Wong, 
Trump Has Called Climate Change a Chinese Hoax. Beijing Says It Is Anything But., N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/world/asia/china-trump-
climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/5PPT-TD7N] (explaining that Donald J. Trump has 
consistently questioned the legitimacy of climate science); Emily Holden, ‘It’ll Change 
Back’: Trump Says Climate Change Not a Hoax, but Denies Lasting Impact, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 15, 2018, 1:48 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/15/itll-change-
back-trump-says-climate-change-not-a-hoax-but-denies-lasting-impact [https://perma.cc/ 
MSK8-SUKS] (finding that President Trump is continuing to question climate science and 
climate change); David M. Ulhmann, The Trump Administration’s Orwellian SAFE Vehicles 
Rule, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/the-trump-
administrations-orwellian-safe-vehicles-rule/ [https://perma.cc/LT8A-HJLC] (discussing 
“President Trump’s refusal to acknowledge the dangers of climate change and his dystopian 
zeal for undoing Obama-era environmental protection rules”); Oliver Milman, ‘It’s a Ghost 
Page’: EPA Site’s Climate Change Section May Be Gone for Good, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 
2018, 3:32 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/01/epa-website-climate-
change-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/7CRK-4P67] (“The EPA under the Trump 
administration has attempted to roll back all key measures designed to address climate 
change . . . .”). 
6 See The Urgenda Climate Case Against the Dutch Government, URGENDA, 
https://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case [https://perma.cc/4KDW-YM69] (last 
visited Oct 8, 2019) (stating that there is a global shift in climate litigation trends with a 
number of suits being launched, in particular against Governments by their citizens in Europe 
and the United States); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016), 
rev’d and remanded, No.18-36082 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2020); Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan 
(2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Pak.) (challenging “the inaction, delay and lack of seriousness 
on the part of the Federal Government and the Government of the Punjab to address the 
challenges and to meet the vulnerabilities associated with Climate Change.”).  
7 David Hasemyer, Fossil Fuels on Trial: Where the Major Climate Change Lawsuits 
Stand Today, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Nov. 8, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/04 
042018/climate-change-fossil-fuel-company-lawsuits-timeline-exxon-children-california-
cities-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/8HVS-GH4M] (detailing the “wave of legal 
challenges . . . washing over the oil and gas industry, demanding accountability for climate 
change, [which] started as a ripple after revelations that ExxonMobil had long recognized 
the threat fossil fuels pose to the world”).  
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County of Santa Cruz,12 City of Santa Cruz13 and the City of Richmond in 
California,14 King County in Washington,15 the State of Rhode Island,16 the City and 
Mayor of Baltimore,17 the City and County of Honolulu,18 as well as crab fishermen 
in California and Oregon,19 have all initiated claims against carbon-major 
corporations. In addition to nuisance-based claims, corporate law fiduciary duties 
have also been in play, with an initial decision holding that directors of ExxonMobil 
should have disclosed relevant information on climate risk to shareholders.20 
Together these new cases constitute the second wave of corporate climate 
litigation.21  
This second wave of litigation highlights a broader set of risks that face carbon-
major corporations. New scientific processes are able to quantify the historical 
proportion of climate impacts and damages for which carbon-major corporations are 
responsible.22 As the science progresses, it is likely that new and better-grounded 
legal challenges against carbon-majors will escalate. Judges are overcoming their 
                                                   
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 City and County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 1CCV-20-0000380 (Haw. Cir. Ct, 
1st Cir., filed Mar. 9, 2020). 
19 Dana Drugmand, Commercial Fishermen Sue Fossil Fuel Industry for Climate 
Impacts, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/ 
2018/11/15/fisheries-crab-climate-change-liability/ [https://perma.cc/G97Q-ZQSY] 
(“Crabbers in California and Oregon have suffered significant economic losses and are 
seeking to hold fossil fuel companies accountable . . . .”).  
20 Karen Savage, Federal Judge: Employees Can Pursue Climate Fraud Suit Against 
Exxon, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/ 
2018/08/15/climate-fraud-suit-exxon-employees-ramirez/ [https://perma.cc/T2AL-THE8] 
(discussing misrepresentations made about climate change).  
21 See Martin Olszynski et al., From Smokes to Smokestacks: Lessons from Tobacco for 
the Future of Climate Change Liability, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2017); Geetanjali 
Ganguly et al., If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change, 38 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 841, 842 (2018) (identifying a second wave of corporate climate 
litigation). An earlier “first wave” of climate litigation in the United States against 
corporations floundered for two primary reasons. First, courts viewed climate change as 
properly within the domain of federal regulation, and held that the federal Clean Air Act 
displaced climate change claims brought under federal common law tort. See generally Am. 
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). Second, plaintiffs struggled to prove 
causation and judges were reluctant to engage with climate science. Id. at 428. At the time, 
science could not link a specific company’s emissions to a specific plaintiff’s damages. Even 
if tort was appropriate, then, it was unclear that plaintiffs could prevail, and so this first wave 
of climate litigation failed. 
22 See Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions 
to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, CLIMATIC CHANGE 229 (2013). 
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prior hesitancy and engaging more directly with new scientific processes and 
outcomes. Litigants are also attempting to overcome federal displacement hurdles23 
that posed a barrier to successful outcomes in the first wave of litigation by 
grounding their claims more closely in state-based common law and statutory 
offenses.24 Even if these renewed litigation efforts experience setbacks or are 
ultimately unsuccessful, corporations are likely to be the subject of increased 
regulatory and public scrutiny as a result.25 Public opinion on climate change is 
already shifting, with the majority of Americans now “alarmed” or “concerned” 
about the issue.26 Changing public opinion could shift political approaches to the 
issue, and incentivize federal regulatory action as already evidenced by the 
                                                   
23 In the first wave of climate litigation, judges deferred to federal statutes such as the 
Clean Air Act, holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law public nuisance 
actions. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424; see also infra Section II.A. In the second 
wave, litigants are relying on state-based claims but are facing preemption hurdles. Federal 
preemption is contained in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution art. IV § 1. The 
two cornerstones of preemption are the purpose of Congress and a presumption against state 
action where Congress has already legislated. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). 
The common law has established two types of federal preemption: express preemption, 
where a federal statute explicitly states that state law is preempted; and implicit preemption, 
where there is no explicit preemption. Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View 
from the Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2010). Federal statutes can reserve state 
action and protect it from federal preemption by the use of savings clauses. The Clean Air 
Act has such a savings clause which has been an issue in the second wave of climate 
litigation. See infra note 133 and infra Section II.E. 
24 See infra Section II.E. 
25 See Sophie Marjanac et al., Acts of God, Human Influence and Litigation, 10 NATURE 
GEOSCIENCE 616, 616 (2017); Ganguly et al., supra note 21, at 842; Olszynski et al., supra 
note 21, at 21.  
26 Abel Gustafson et al., Americans Are Increasingly “Alarmed” About Global 
Warming, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/americans-are-increasingly-alarmed-
about-global-warming/ [https://perma.cc/R6H9-VZ2U] (noting that six in ten Americans are 
either alarmed or concerned about climate change, with the proportion of Americans alarmed 
about climate change doubling from 2013 to 2018); although almost half of Americans are 
unwilling to pay for climate policies. See Adam Aton, Most Americans Want Climate Change 
Policies, SCI. AM. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/most-
americans-want-climate-change-policies/ [https://perma.cc/5MMB-U6PT] (noting that in a 
2017 poll 7 out of 10 Americans believed climate change was happening but half would be 
unwilling to pay even $1.00 more on their electricity bills to lower emissions). 
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introduction of the Green New Deal in Congress,27 and renewed efforts by 
Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives on climate legislation.28 
This second wave of litigation has important implications for directors of 
carbon-major corporations as it highlights the risks of climate change to corporations 
and the financial implications of those risks. The risks of climate change have 
become so great that they threaten corporate profits and international fiscal 
stability.29 Directors must consider the financial implications of climate risks in 
order to comply with their fiduciary duties. Risks to corporations include transition 
and physical risks. Transition risks are those risks associated with the transition to a 
lower-carbon economy, such as policy or regulatory changes, as well as litigation, 
technology, market changes, and reputational risk.30 Physical risks affect operational 
assets and supply chains and are driven by both slow impacts of climate change, 
such as a rising sea-level, as well as extreme weather events, such as droughts, 
wildfires, storms, and flooding. Risks specific to the energy industry include water 
                                                   
27 While light on detail at the moment, the Green New Deal proposal puts forward a 
series of actions to address both climate change and economic inequality, by decarbonizing 
the electricity grid, transportation systems, and industry. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. 
(2019). 
28 Ari Natter & Anna Edgerton, Pelosi Says House to Revisit Climate Bill Based on 
2009 Bill, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2019, 10:10 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic 
les/2019-01-04/pelosi-says-house-to-revisit-climate-plan-based-on-2009-bill-jqiapimq 
[https://perma.cc/BL4J-RU2L].  
29 Mark Carney, in his position as the Governor of the Bank of England, highlighted 
the potential risks of climate change to both industries and international fiscal stability. He 
noted that climate change could negatively affect between four to forty-three trillion dollars 
of global assets by the end of the century. See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE 
COST OF INACTION: RECOGNIZING THE VALUE AT RISK FROM CLIMATE CHANGE (2015), 
https://eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/The%20cost%20of%20inaction_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6X2E-MYLK]. Carney’s 2015 speech to insurers in Lloyds of London 
stated that the risks of climate change are threefold: physical risks to insured assets, liability 
risks from litigation, and transition risks, including financial risks from changing regulatory 
requirements to transition to a lower-carbon economy. He also highlighted the role of initial 
law suits against pension fund managers of carbon major companies in elevating long-term 
risks of climate change and their implications for fiduciary duties. His speech at Lloyds of 
London in 2015 was the precursor to the establishment of the Task Force on Climate-Related 
Financial Disclosures by the G-20. Nina Chestney, G20 Task Force Issues Framework for 
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shortages, melting permafrost affecting transportation routes, and damage to coastal 
energy infrastructure.31 
Despite these risks, directors, officers, and their legal advisors justifiably may 
have been, and continue to be, operating under the view that corporate fiduciary 
duties either prevent or disincentivize directors from focusing corporate attention 
and resources on combatting climate change. In accordance with this view, some 
directors will have hesitated or declined to assess and address climate-related risks.32 
This is largely due to corporate law focusing almost exclusively on shareholders and 
shareholder profits.33 Directors’ fiduciary duties are duties imposed by statute and 
common law on directors, and owed by directors primarily to the corporation.34 The 
shareholder wealth maximization norm is a powerful norm that has guided the 
interpretation of directors’ duties under corporate law for many decades.35 Like 
corporate law, it places shareholders, and their perceived need for profit 
maximization, at the heart of directors’ duties.  
This Article takes a different perspective and urges a contrary approach. 
Corporations will face increased legal responsibility as climate science improves, 
climate impacts escalate in frequency and severity, corporations and the public face 
increased risks, and public opinion shifts. Corporate fiduciary duties and the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm that guides their application compel 
directors to identify and assess the risks of climate change to the corporation, and 
may even incentivize directors to address these risks, particularly if they take a long-
term management approach. While short-term business perspectives may still pose 
barriers to progressive climate action, new research is pointing to a business case for 
transitioning away from fossil fuels and towards cleaner energy sources, even for 
the largest carbon-major corporations. Businesses are also failing to address climate-
induced risks and damage in the short-term as well. The business case for climate 
action, combined with the increased risks of climate change to corporations, should 
spur progressive action, even as fiduciary duties are interpreted under Delaware law 
                                                   
31 Infra Section IV.A. Climate change impacts will be felt across economies, and 
impacts will be differentiated across sectors. See Sarah Barker, An Introduction to Directors’ 
Duties in Relation to Stranded Asset Risks, in STRANDED ASSETS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
RISKS, RESILIENCE AND OPPORTUNITY 202 (Routledge 2018). Even within the fossil fuel 
industry some sectors have already been affected differently, with bankruptcies seen 
throughout the coal industry. 
32 See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://nyti.ms/1LSk9ku [https://perma.cc/XZT8-TC3G].  
33 Id. 
34 For example, the Model Business Corporation Act states that all directors shall act in 
good faith and in a manner that the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of 
the corporation. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8:30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). Likewise, 
Tennessee law states that directors shall discharge all duties in a manner the director 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-
301(a) (2019). 
35 See Joan Hemingway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes, 
Decisional Law and Organic Documents, 74 WASH & LEE LAW REV. 939, 950–56 (2017). 
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(where most carbon-major corporations are headquartered). A climate-friendly 
approach should be viewed by directors not only as a response to risk, but also as 
part of a strategy to adapt to climate impacts in the short, medium, and long-term, 
and ensure profitability for shareholders. 
Corporate action, moreover, is essential for dramatic and much-needed 
contributions to meeting global climate goals under the Paris Agreement. As 
Vandenbergh and Gilligan note, private environmental governance and corporate 
actions can achieve major greenhouse gas emission reductions in the face of 
government gridlock.36 Corporate law can be an important tool to facilitate 
progressive climate action by corporations.37 Identifying corporate law as a bridge 
and not a barrier to ambitious corporate climate action, therefore, has broad 
relevance. This Article illustrates that the road to meeting the Paris Agreement’s 
climate goals could, in fact, run through Delaware-based corporate law. 
This Article is structured as follows. Part I describes why climate change poses 
difficulties for corporate law, and why carbon-majors are the focus of renewed 
litigation efforts. Part II charts the evolving nature of climate litigation against these 
actors, including hurdles encountered in the tort-based first wave of climate 
litigation, and how the second wave of litigation is attempting to overcome these 
hurdles.38 Part III examines new risks and responsibilities thrown up by this second 
                                                   
36 Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 217, 220 (2015) (identifying private environmental governance as actions by 
private organizations performed without government collaboration, delegation or 
outsourcing). In the existing government gridlock, Vandenbergh and Gilligan explain that 
while private actions are a second-best option to government action, these activities are 
critical and could reduce emissions by roughly 1,000 million tons of CO2 per year between 
2016-2025. Id.; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, THE DRIVERS OF CORPORATE CLIMATE 
MITIGATION, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 29 (2018); Michael P. Vandenbergh, PRIVATE 
ACTORS: PART OF THE PROBLEM, PART OF THE SOLUTION, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 
48 (2017). 
37 See generally Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 
STAN. L. REV. 137 (2019) (arguing that corporate law should in fact be understood as a 
fundamental part of environmental law). 
38 This Article eschews a comprehensive comparative survey of climate litigation 
around the globe, as this work has already been undertaken by other scholars. See, e.g., David 
Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New 
Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012); UN ENVIRONMENT 
PROGRAMME, THE STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A GLOBAL REVIEW (2017), 
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/05/Burger-Gundlach-2017-05-UN-Envt-CC-Liti 
gation.pdf [https://perma.cc/BNT5-JPLH]; DENA P. ADLER, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL SABIN 
CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN THE AGE OF 
TRUMP: YEAR ONE (2018), https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/d8-dg03-
cm33 [https://perma.cc/E43C-F6R9]; Brian J. Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part 1), 
2011 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 3 [hereinafter Preston, (Part 1)]; Brian J. Preston, Climate 
Change Litigation (Part 2), 2011 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 244 [hereinafter Preston, 
(Part 2)]; R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate Change and 
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wave of litigation by providing a synthesis of directors’ duties under Delaware law 
and highlighting how these developments in climate litigation may (and should) 
affect corporate behavior in the context of climate risk. It also examines potential 
barriers to climate liability. Part IV charts a potential way forward for directors, 
highlighting the management tools and strategies that are available to them.  
 
I.  THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR CORPORATE LAW  
 
Climate change poses significant issues for legal structures and governance. 
Climate change is highly polycentric, dynamic, uncertain, and socio-politically 
sensitive, and so poses challenges to legal orders which seek certainty and stability.39 
The structure of the law is subdivided into specific levels of governance and 
therefore is ineffective in governing a problem such as climate change, which has 
impacts on local, regional, and international scales.40 Climate change has been 
described as a “super wicked” policy problem,41 as it poses challenges to legal orders 
that are designed to create and maintain legal stability for traditional governance 
regimes.42  
In addition, climate science is a particularly complex discipline. It involves 
elements of risk, probability, and, therefore, uncertainty. There are uncertain 
temporal delays between emissions and effects. And since it is impossible to run 
                                                   
the Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 295 (2017); Michael C. Blumm 
& Mary Cristina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process and the 
Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2017); JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, 
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY (2015). This 
Article focuses instead on the potential impacts of this litigation on corporations generally 
and on the nexus between climate risk and directors’ fiduciary duties more specifically, as 
this is an under researched area of law in climate litigation scholarship. See generally Joana 
Setzer & Lisa C. Vanhala, Climate Change litigation: A Review of Research on Courts and 
Litigants in Climate Governance, 10 WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEW: CLIMATE CHANGE 
580 (2019) (identifying 130 articles on climate change litigation published between 200 and 
2018 in order to understand and better situate emerging themes of climate change litigation). 
It is important to note that corporations themselves are not passive players in this arena and 
have been active in litigation efforts, acting as plaintiffs in a number of suits. It is also 
important to note that some corporations have been progressive and proactive in the climate 
change arena, and so not all carbon-major corporations can be classed as “laggards.” 
However, this Article focuses on a small subset of cases where carbon major corporations 
are defendants in order to assess the implications of these cases for directors’ fiduciary duties. 
39 Elizabeth Fisher et al., The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change, 80 MOD. 
L. REV. 173, 174 (2017). 
40 Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal 
Regulatory Role, 49 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 586, 591 (2009). 
41 Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009). 
42 Fisher et al., supra note 39, at 176. 
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controlled experiments, the discipline is heavily dependent upon climate models.43 
As Fisher et al. note, “[t]he dynamic nature of climate change does not sit easily with 
legal orders that value stability and legal certainty.”44 These are difficult areas for 
judges to wrap their arms around and may explain previous judicial reticence in 
engaging with climate change and climate science in particular. 
 
A.  The Failure of Corporate Law to Address Climate Change 
 
Climate change challenges legal orders, and this dynamic is further highlighted 
within the realm of corporate law and its application to carbon-major corporations. 
Corporate law is traditionally designed to focus on shareholders and profit-making, 
with non-shareholders being relegated to the realm of environmental law or some 
other non-corporate legal arena.45 Environmental issues, including climate change, 
are traditionally viewed as beyond the responsibility and remit of corporate law. 
Transnational carbon-major corporations have been largely unregulated in terms of 
their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,46 and corporate law has been an underused 
tool to incentivize emissions reduction.47 Most carbon-major corporations 
                                                   
43 Id. at 179. 
44 Id. at 181. 
45 Shareholder primacy and contractarian theories have consistently argued that 
externalities are more appropriately catered for by welfare laws and environmental or other 
regulations outside of the realm of corporate law. They argue that corporate law should focus 
solely on shareholders and shareholder wealth maximization. See Friedman, supra note 32; 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1446–48 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales 
for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 
STETSON L. REV. 23, 26–39 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate 
Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. 401, 401–07 (1993); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 
440–43 (2000) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law]; 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L. J. 387, 390 (2000); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is Corporate 
Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 13 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 591 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor 
Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1430–31 (1993) [hereinafter Bainbridge, In Defense]; 
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1480 (1989); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 
IND. L. REV. 223, 223–27 (1991). See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders 
Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784–86 (2006); Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and 
the Function of Corporation Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 141, 144–47 (2005).  
46 Lisa Benjamin, The Responsibilities of Carbon Major Companies: Are They (and Is 
the Law) Doing Enough?, 5 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 353, 353–54 (2016). 
47 Id. at 375–76; Lisa Benjamin, The Duty of Due Consideration in the Anthropocene: 
Climate Risk and English Directorial Duties, 11 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 90, 93–96 
 
324 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
traditionally approach emissions reductions as a voluntary and largely ethical 
initiative, and part of broader corporate social responsibility aims.48 Climate change 
is a particularly intractable problem for these types of corporations as efforts to 
reduce or internalize the costs of GHG emissions undermines their business 
models.49 GHG emissions are treated as a negative externality by corporate law, a 
cost to be pushed outside of the corporation and absorbed by society.50 Climate 
change is the “mother of all externalities”51 or “perhaps the greatest negative meta-
externality ever imposed by economic systems on the natural world,”52 and one that 
corporate law has traditionally been unwilling to address. Corporate law has 
encouraged the outsourcing of negative externalities beyond the responsibility of the 
corporation, as this approach is more profitable.53 Carbon-majors are a major source 
of GHG emissions, but they have not yet been held legally responsible for their 
contributions to climate change. 
 
B.  Why Carbon-Majors? 
 
Carbon-majors have become the focus of a new wave of climate litigation. 
There are several reasons why they have attracted renewed legal attention. Only a 
small number of carbon-major corporations contribute a large amount of GHG 
emissions.54 The concentration of these entities into large, transnational groups, 
combined with their long history in the industry, make them accountable entities in 
terms of the quantity of their historical emissions. They have continued to operate 
around the globe largely unregulated in terms of their GHG emissions.55 Lack of 
                                                   
(2017); SARAH BARKER ET AL., DIRECTORS’ PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE 
INACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 21 (2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/569da64 
79cadb6436a8fecc8/t/56e211bb27d4bd91a217cd88/1457656252528/Directors_liability_in
action_February_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XEU-G2EB]; Beate Sjafjell, Why Law 
Matters: Corporate Social Irresponsibility and the Futility of Voluntary Climate Mitigation, 
8 EUR. COMPANY L. 56, 61–64 (2011). 
48 Benjamin, supra note 46, at 368–70. 
49 Id. at 357–58; Sjafjell, supra note 47, 56–58; Jim Krane, Climate Change and Fossil 
Fuel: An Examination of Risks for the Energy Industry and Producer States, 4 MRS ENERGY 
& SUSTAINABILITY: REV. J. 1, 5–8 (2017). 
50 An externality is a cost or benefit which is externalized outside of the corporation. A 
negative externality is a cost. 
51 Richard S. J. Tol, The Economic Effects of Climate Change, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 29, 29 (2009). 
52 Rosetta Lombardo & Giovanni D’Orio, Corporate and State Social Responsibility: 
A Long-Term Perspective, 3 MOD. ECON. 91, 92 (2012). 
53 Benjamin, supra note 46, at 354–58. 
54 Heede, supra note 22, at 234. 
55 Peter C. Frumhoff et al., The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon 
Producers, 132 CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 158–62 (2015). 
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regulatory oversight may be another reason for the recent emergence of litigation 
against these entities.56  
New scientific processes have clearly identified the monumental contributions 
corporate emissions have made to climate change and related negative impacts.57 
These new scientific processes can identify the specific contributions corporations 
have made to climate change, making them a clearer target for litigation as well as, 
independent of litigation, regulatory attention. New scientific studies challenge the 
prevailing assumption that corporate law should not consider and address the 
contributions of corporations to climate change.58 The studies demonstrate that 
corporate actors are the primary cause of historical emissions and clearly articulate 
their factual responsibility. These corporations also have high levels of scientific and 
technical expertise, and thus were in a position to understand and act on available 
climate data. Rather than acting on this new data, however, many of the corporations 
in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom sought to discredit 
and disparage scientific evidence and lobbied to prevent policies that encouraged a 
transition away from fossil fuels.59  
In addition, and combined with increased litigation and regulatory risks, the 
impacts of climate change are mounting, and directors, as well as investors such as 
institutional investors and financiers, are now encouraged to view climate risk in a 
bidirectional manner – considering both the contributions of corporations to climate 
impacts but also the significant impacts and risks climate change poses to their 
businesses. These risks are particularly acute for carbon-major corporations, and 
investors are becoming concerned. Carbon-majors’ deceptive approach to climate 
change, combined with their substantial presence in the value chain and high 
exposure to climate risk, makes them “prime litigation targets.”60 New scientific 
                                                   
56 Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. 695, 717–
18 (2016). 
57 See infra Section II.B. 
58 Heede, supra note 22, at 229–30.  
59 Frumhoff et al., supra note 55, at 159–63. The Union of Concerned Scientists also 
enumerate the decades-long campaign described in internal corporate documents carried out 
by a handful of carbon-major corporations such as Chevron, BP, Shell, Conoco Philips, 
ExxonMobil and Peabody Energy to deceive the American public by distorting the realities 
and risks of climate change, block policies designed to hasten the transition to clean energy, 
and carry out a coordinated campaign to spread climate misinformation in order to maintain 
their profitability. See generally KATHY MULVEY & SETH SHULMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, THE CLIMATE DECEPTION DOSSIERS: INTERNAL FOSSIL FUEL MEMOS 
REVEALED DECADES OF CORPORATE DISINFORMATION (2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites 
/default/files/attach/2015/07/The-Climate-Deception-Dossiers.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYH3-
HB2L] (providing a summary of seven “deception dossiers” of internal company and trade 
association documents that have been leaked to the public as part of a coordinated campaign 
to allegedly spread climate misinformation and block climate action). 
60 Sonja van Renssen, Courts Take on Climate Change, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 
655, 656 (2016). 
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studies, combined with the increasing risk of climate change to society and 
corporations, have helped to make carbon-majors the focus of climate litigation.  
 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF CLIMATE LITIGATION  
 
The first wave of climate litigation against carbon-major corporations faced a 
number of hurdles.61 These included problems in proving causation under tort law, 
how to identify an appropriate class of defendants and issues of standing,62 the 
                                                   
61 This first wave of litigation focuses on a select group of cases where carbon-major 
corporations stood as defendants, but it should be noted that there have been a number of 
pro- and anti- regulation suits in the United States as well. For example, in Massachusetts v. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency (EPA), 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly accepted 
climate science and ushered in a regulatory mandate for the EPA to regulate GHG emissions 
under the Clean Air Act. See Melissa Powers, Country Report: USA Climate Change in the 
Supreme Court, 2012 IUCN ACADEMY ENVTL. L.J. 245, 246 (2012) (noting that the outcome 
of American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), could have been 
influenced by the changing regulatory context of climate change under the Obama 
Administration). 
62 While this Article does not deal with issues of standing in depth, standing issues did 
occur in the first wave of litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Article III of 
the U.S. Constitution as requiring that, in order to have standing to bring a case in federal 
court, the plaintiff must establish: (i) the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact; (ii) that injury 
is fairly traceable to the defendant’s misconduct; and (iii) the injury is capable of being 
redressed by the court. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007); Lujan v. Def. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). The Murphy Oil case is a notable example of both 
issues of standing and causality in the context of suits against carbon major corporations, 
though the case is ultimately unhelpful due to a number of procedural oddities that took 
place. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs in Murphy 
Oil sued a number of corporations, including insurance corporations, carbon major 
corporations, and banks, for damages wrought by Hurricane Katrina. The plaintiffs targeted 
carbon major corporations due to their contributions to climate change, which the plaintiffs 
claimed led to the unprecedented strength of the storm. The plaintiffs pointed to the 
knowledge of carbon major corporations about climate change and their lack of action to use 
technology or their profits to combat it. Id. at 864–65. While the district court dismissed the 
case for various reasons, including lack of standing, an appellate panel in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to bring claims of 
public and private nuisance, trespass and negligence, which all depended on a causal link 
between emissions and destruction of their property. Id. at 879–80. The Fifth Circuit panel 
relied on Massachusetts v. EPA, which acknowledged a plausible link between man-made 
emissions and global warning. Id. at 865–866 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007)). On top of this standing conclusion, the panel’s causation analysis is also notable in 
that the court accepted, at the pleadings stage at least, a fairly traceable connection between 
the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant for standing purposes. 
Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d at 879–80. According to the panel, traceability in this context did not 
require the demonstration of scientific certainty that the corporations’ emissions caused the 
precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Instead, the court recognized that injuries could be 
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political question doctrine,63 as well as the difficulty in linking harm to a particular 
person or entity caused by specific emissions from one state or one company.64 
Causation requires that plaintiffs demonstrate a causal connection between the harm 
suffered and the actions of the defendant. Causation remains factually difficult, if 
not impossible, to prove due to the disparate nature of GHG emissions, and so 
remains a challenge for litigation against corporations, even in the second wave of 
litigation. Emissions of GHGs from different sources mix in the atmosphere and 
have impacts all over the globe. As a result, this process of mixing makes attributing 
a particular harm to a particular emitter difficult, if not impossible. This creates 
significant hurdles for plaintiffs in tort-based actions, although new scientific 
processes are closing the causation gap. This section will focus on judicial reluctance 
to take on the complexity of climate science, and judicial preference to defer the 
issue to legislative bodies based on, among other issues, federal displacement 
arguments in the first wave of climate litigation. These difficulties have, in the past, 
created insurmountable barriers for tort-based litigation suits against corporations. 
This section will demonstrate how litigants are attempting to dismantle these two 
hurdles in the second wave of climate litigation.  
 
A.  Hurdles in the First Wave of Climate Litigation 
 
The first wave of cases against carbon-majors failed primarily due to the federal 
displacement doctrine – that federal legislation such as the Clean Air Act displaces 
federal common law. A number of courts in the United States preferred to defer the 
issue, instead, to legislative bodies. Judges were also reluctant and/or poorly 
equipped to deal with the complexities of climate science. 
Two major cases in the first wave of litigation were American Electric Power 
Co. v. Connecticut (AEP)65 and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. 
(Kivalina).66 These cases illustrate judicial inadequacies when dealing with climate 
                                                   
fairly traceable to actions that contributed to, rather than solely or materially caused, 
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. Id. at 864–66.  
These initial wins for the Murphy Oil plaintiffs were short-lived, however. The panel’s 
decision in Murphy Oil was vacated when the Fifth Circuit agreed to an en banc review. 
Although the court agreed to hear the en banc panel, it was unable to form a quorum and 
thus dismissed the case, and the panel’s decision remained vacated. Comer v. Murphy Oil, 
607 F.3d 1049, 1053–55 (5th Cir. 2010).  
63 The political question doctrine states that courts will only adjudicate matters of law 
and will refrain from adjudicating matters which are determined to be political questions 
which are best left to the legislature, as stipulated in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). See, e.g., City of Oakland v. B.P., 325 F. Supp. 3d 
1017, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal pending, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020). 
64 See Preston, (Part 1), supra note 38, at 7; Josephine van Zeben, Establishing a 
Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?, 
4 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 339, 348 (2015). 
65 564 U.S. 410. 
66 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).  
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science, as well as a judicial reluctant to adjudicate such a systemic issue as climate 
change. Some of these hurdles are being challenged in the second wave of climate 
litigation.  
AEP was a public nuisance suit brought by eight states and New York City 
against six electric and utility corporations. The plaintiffs argued that the emissions 
of these corporations interfered with public rights and asked the court to impose 
declining emission caps on these entities in order to reduce emissions.67 The 
Supreme Court rejected the claim, holding that the Clean Air Act “displaced” any 
federal nuisance action dealing with climate change.68 Justice Ginsburg, writing for 
a unanimous Court, wrote that there was no “parallel track” for federal nuisance 
claims on climate change.69 This definitive statement by the Supreme Court 
effectively closed the door to future federal nuisance common law claims on climate 
change,70 even though the EPA had not taken comprehensive action on climate 
change at the time.71  
AEP also illustrates the judicial reluctance, or “skittishness,”72 of the courts in 
dealing with climate change disputes and climate science. Burkett notes the 
regressive approach of the Court in acknowledging climate science, as the Court in 
AEP cited a skeptical magazine article in the same context as multiple peer-reviewed 
articles, going on to make a “facile indictment”73 of all living, breathing individuals 
as contributing to climate change. The reluctance of the judiciary to appropriately 
cater for climate science, in this case, stands in contrast to newer judicial attitudes 
to climate science illustrated in the second wave of climate litigation. The AEP case 
                                                   
67 Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 418–19. 
68 Id. at 423; see also James Flynn, Climate of Confusion: Climate Change Litigation 
in the Wake of American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 823, 846 
(2013); Fredric Eisenstate, American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut: How One 
Less Legal Theory Available in the Effort to Curb Emissions Is Actually One Step Forward 
for the Cause, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 222 (2012); Phillip Divisek, Climate Change Torts: 
American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 7 MACQUARIE J. INT’L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 108, 
108 (2011). 
69 Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425. 
70 Flynn, supra note 68, at 856; Divisek, supra note 68, at 109. 
71 The Court in AEP held that plaintiffs’ nuisance claims were displaced by the Clean 
Air Act regardless of whether the “EPA actually exercises its regulatory authority,” and 
“[t]he critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision whether and how to 
regulate carbon-dioxide emissions . . . the delegation is what displaces federal common law.” 
Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425–26. But see Flynn, supra note 68, at 847–48 (arguing 
that the Clean Air Act only addresses domestic air resources whereas the impacts of climate 
change are more complex, exceeding impacts on air, and are also transboundary). This may 
point to a general reluctance by the judiciary to tackle what they considered to be a political 
issue. 
72 Maxine Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
115, 118 (2011). 
73 Id. This approach lies in stark contrast to Massachusetts v. EPA, where the Supreme 
Court easily accepted climate science. 549 U.S. at 521–22. 
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also revealed the concerns of the judiciary over acting as arbiters of scientific 
debates.74 The enormity of the issue of climate change and its implications for 
industrial development may also have been decisive factors for courts in the first 
wave of climate litigation. Courts have been reluctant to make definitive findings of 
fact about climate change and are sensitive to climate change policy being the 
purview of legislative bodies.75  
In Kivalina, the Alaskan Native Village of Kivalina brought a suit for public 
nuisance against twenty-two fossil-fuel producers.76 The Village claimed that these 
corporations contributed to climate change, which led to the dramatic reduction of 
the Arctic sea ice that had previously sheltered their homes from winter storms.77 In 
September 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of their 
claim, concluding that common law tort claims had been “displaced” by federal 
legislation.78 The decision did not address the district court’s refusal to determine 
what acceptable levels of emissions by the corporate defendants should be and who 
should bear the costs of those emissions.79 The Kivalina decision suggests that AEP 
will continue to apply to all federal U.S. climate change tort claims, regardless of 
the specified remedy.80 Powers notes that AEP effectively foreclosed the use of 
federal tort law to mitigate climate change.81 Both AEP and Kivalina laid bare the 
                                                   
74 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 56, at 766. 
75 For example, the Court in AEP asserted that courts “lack the scientific, economic, 
and technological resources [of] an agency . . . ” to regulate climate change. Am. Elec. Power 
Co. 564 U.S. at 428. As another example, in People v. General Motors Corp., California lost 
its suit against major automobile manufacturers for impacts from climate change partly due 
to the court determining it was not able to impose damages without unreasonably 
encroaching onto global issues. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 17, 2007); see Ganguly et. al., supra note 21, at 12; Weaver & Kysar supra note 38, at 
325 (stating that courts were overwhelmed by the sheer complexity and size of the climate 
change problem); James Huffman, Previously Unrecognized Rights: Climate Change 
Lawsuits and the Rule of Law, QUILLETTE (Oct. 30, 2018), https://quillette.com/2018/10/30/ 
previously-unrecognized-rights-climate-change-lawsuits-and-the-rule-of-law/ [https://perm 
a.cc/8A69-GCN2]. 
76 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
77 Id. at 855; see Flynn, supra note 68, at 836; Peter Manus, Kivalina at the Supreme 
Court: A Lost Opportunity for Federal Common Law, 8 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 
223, 225 (2014). 
78 Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858. In May 2013, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ 
petition for certiorari without comment, leaving the Ninth Circuit decision intact. Native Vill. 
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1000 
(2013); see Karine Péloffy, Kivalina v. ExxonMobil: A Comparative Case Commentary, 9 
MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. POL’Y 119, 122 (2013). 
79 Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 854 (affirming the district court’s holding that these “were 
matters more appropriately left for determination by the executive or legislative branch”).  
80 Quin M. Sorenson, Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corporation: The End 
of “Climate Change” Tort Litigation?, 44 ABA TRENDS 1, 6 (2013). 
81 Powers, supra note 61, at 245. 
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judicial preference in U.S. courts to ensure that climate change is decided by the 
legislature.82 This judicial preference persists in the second wave of climate 
litigation and, as a result of these cases, federal common law nuisance claims on 
climate change against corporations still face tremendous hurdles. Litigants in the 
second wave of climate litigation have attempted to dismantle these hurdles, with 
varying levels of success. Litigants have started to draft their claims in order to avoid 
the federal displacement doctrine.83 They have also been assisted by new scientific 
                                                   
82 Flynn, supra note 68, at 837. 
83 For example, a class action suit was launched by young people in the U.S. District 
Court for the District Court of Oregon, claiming that the actions of the federal government 
that caused climate change, as well as the government’s inaction to prevent it, had violated 
the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Due Process rights by denying protection provided to 
previous generations, by favoring economic short-term interests and denying future 
generations of essential natural resources, including a safe climate. Juliana v. United States, 
217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233–34 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 
Jan. 17, 2020). At the time of writing, the case was proceeding to a request for a Ninth Circuit 
en banc review. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Juliana, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 
2020) (No.18-36082). However, industry intervenors had already withdrawn, partly due, 
according to Blumm and Wood, to concerns about having to respond to disclosure requests. 
Despite their withdrawal being granted, Blumm and Wood argue that exposure of the 
relationship between government and the fossil fuel industry will prove to be one of the more 
devastating outcomes of the case. Blumm & Wood, supra note 38, at 28, 55 (citing Order at 
5, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC)). Blumm and Wood also note 
Juliana’s use of the public trust doctrine (PTD), which would be exempted from the federal 
displacement doctrine, which only applies to federal common law claims, whereas the 
District Court recognized the PTD as an “inherent limit on sovereignty and implicit in the 
Constitution’s due process clause.” Id. at 51–52 (citing Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261). If 
successful, the regulatory implications of this case would be vast and, as a result, it has been 
called the “trial of the century.” See Peter Singer, The Trial of the Century, Fighting for a 
Healthier Planet, THE DAILY STAR (Sept. 15, 2018, 12:09 AM), https://www.dailystar.com. 
lb/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=463429&mode=print [https://perma.cc/DFG3-QSH8]. The 
procedural elements of the case are extremely complex. As part of these proceedings, Chief 
Justice Roberts granted a temporary halt in response to a request by the federal government 
to stay the case. In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 16, vacated, 139 S. Ct. 452 (2018); see also 
Michael Blumm & Mary Wood, These Kids and Young Adults Want Their Day in Court on 
Climate Change, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 26, 2018, 6:44 AM), http://theconversation.com/ 
these-kids-and-young-adults-want-their-day-in-court-on-climate-change-105277 [https://pe 
rma.cc/8VV3-6PZP]. However, the stay was subsequently lifted. In re United States, 139 S. 
Ct. 452, 453 (2018). An oral hearing was held in front of the Ninth Circuit on June 4, 2019. 
See Oliver A. Houck, The Children’s Climate Case: Our Obligation to Future Generations, 
THE HILL (Nov. 6, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/415307-the-
childrens-climate-case-our-obligation-to-future-generations [https://perma.cc/YR9D-
8RCS]. In January 2020, the Ninth Circuit ruled 2-1 to dismiss the lawsuit. Juliana, 947 F.3d 
at 1175. While the court accepted climate science and that urgent action was needed, it 
dismissed the suit on the basis of lack of standing based on the inability of the court to provide 
redress. Id. Judge Josephine Staton’s dissent in the case, however, is notable. See Juliana, 
947 F.3d at 1175–91 (Staton, J. dissenting). Class action suits by young people were also 
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processes and developments which have clearly attributed the majority of historical 
GHG emissions to carbon-major corporations, and judges have started to engage 
more confidently with this new climate science. 
 
B.  New Scientific Processes 
 
Recent developments in scientific processes have identified the contributions 
of carbon-majors to climate change and provided an impetus to renewed climate 
litigation efforts. In 2013, Richard Heede published a groundbreaking quantitative 
analysis of historic fossil fuel and cement production records of 90 leading investor-
owned, state-owned, and nation-state producers of oil, natural gas, coal, and cement. 
His study concluded that these 90 carbon-major entities were responsible for 63% 
of cumulative worldwide industrial emissions of carbon dioxide and methane from 
1854–2010.84 Investor-owned entities contributed the majority of these emissions, 
315 gigatonnes, followed closely by nation-states, and state-owned fossil fuel and 
cement-producing entities.85 The twenty largest investor- and state-owned energy 
corporations were responsible for 29.5% of all global industrial emissions, and the 
ten largest investor-owned corporations alone were responsible for 15.8% of global 
industrial emissions through 2010.86  
Heede’s analysis has been revolutionary in terms of its ability to attribute a 
percentage of global emissions to these entities. Heede’s work has been a motivating 
factor in the second wave of litigation around the world against these entities, and it 
has been referred to in almost every new suit launched against carbon-major 
corporations.87 Heede’s research demonstrates the gap between scientific attribution 
and legal assignment of responsibility. The law has so far fallen behind scientific 
progress in the context of corporate climate emissions and, therefore, corporate 
accountability. Whether or not Heede’s factual accountability can be translated into 
legal accountability is unclear, particularly within tort law. 
Heede’s carbon-major study has been further developed by probabilistic event 
attribution science, often called attribution science.88 This discipline is developing 
                                                   
launched in 2018 in: Canada, Environnement Jeunesse v. Procureur Général du Canada, 
[2018] No. 500-06; Florida, First Amended Complaint, Reynolds v. Florida, No. 18-CA-
000819 (Dec. 26, 2018); Washington, Aji P. v. Washington, No. 18-2-04448-1-SEA (Wash. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2018); and Alaska in 2017, Sinnok v. Alaska, No. 3AN-17-09910 
(Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2018). 
84 Heede, supra note 22, at 234. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See, e.g., Hasemyer, supra note 7. 
88 See GABRIELE C. HEGERL ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE [IPCC], GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE PAPER ON DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION 
RELATED TO ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE CHANGE 2–7 (Thomas Stocker et al. eds., 2009), 
http://www.ipcc-wg2.awi.de/guidancepaper/IPCC_D%26A_GoodPracticeGuidancePaper. 
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quickly and is able to attribute the multiplying contribution of climate change to 
particular extreme events, although attribution science is more confident in certain 
areas than others.89 Event attribution relies on observational records to determine 
changes in probability or magnitude of climate-related events and uses model 
simulations to compare the manifestation of an event in a world with human-caused 
climate change and a world without.90 It does this by constructing factual and 
counterfactual probabilities or worlds. A factual probability is one where an event 
occurs in the currently observed world as it exists in the context of climate change, 
and a counterfactual probability occurs in a hypothetical “control” world without 
human influence on the climate.91 By comparing the real-world events to the 
hypothetical ones, climate scientists can predict which events were caused, at least 
in part, by climate change. 
This new process of attribution science has been applied to corporate actors as 
well and has the potential to impact legal tests such as causation. Therefore, 
attribution science is likely to inspire future litigation efforts against these actors. 
Fossil fuel corporations are becoming an increasing focal point of attribution efforts, 
                                                   
pdf [https://perma.cc/DMS3-XGB7] (reviewing the effect climate change is having on the 
earth via attribution theory and providing for methodology, different approaches, and data 
usage of the attribution based analysis); see also NATHANIEL L. BINDOFF ET AL., 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE FROM GLOBAL TO REGIONAL (Judit Bartholy et al. eds., 2018), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_Chapter10_FINAL.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/G5PU-PC5E] (discussing the detection and attribution evaluation methodologies 
and the effect attribution has on climate change). The National Academies Press recently 
published a report on the state of attribution science, stating that scientific understanding of 
climate and weather mechanisms is improving, and as a result rapid progress is being made 
in event attribution. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., ATTRIBUTION OF EXTREME 
WEATHER EVENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 6–7 (National Academies Press 
2016). 
89 Confidence in attribution studies is strongest where there exist long historical records 
of observations which can be simulated adequately by climate models. These tend to be 
purely meteorological events which are not strongly influenced by issues such as 
infrastructure and population trends, or in circumstances where other factors can be carefully 
and reliably considered. The findings are strongest for extreme events related to aspects of 
temperature, such as extreme heat or cold events and heavy rainfall, and tend to be less robust 
for tropical cyclones, wildfires and drought. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. ENG’G, & MED., supra 
note 88, at 1–13.  
90 Id. at 2–3. 
91 Id. at x (noting the first attribution study was published in 2004 regarding the 
European heatwave in 2003, and estimated that the summer was 0.5°C warmer); see also 
Peter A. Stott et al., Human Contribution to the European Heatwave of 2003, 432 NATURE 
610, 610–14 (2004). Event attribution science has progressed tremendously since that date, 
with Daniel Mitchell et al.’s study being able to now attribute a certain number of deaths 
during the heatwave to human induced climate change. See Daniel Mitchell et al., Attributing 
Human Mortality During Extreme Heat Waves to Anthropogenic Climate Change, 11 
ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS 1 (2016).  
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building on the initial work by Heede, in relation to specific temperature increases 
and sea-levels. Heede’s work has been expanded by Ekwurzel et al., who recently 
published a paper tracing the contributions of emissions by several carbon-major 
corporations to the rise in global mean surface temperatures. Their paper determined 
that the combustion of products from 90 carbon-major entities from 1880–2010 led 
to 0.4°C increase in global mean surface temperatures, constituting 50% of the total 
global increase during this time period.92 Combustion from 1980–2010 led to a 
0.28°C rise, constituting 35.1% of total global mean surface temperature increase 
during that period.93 Their models are scalable and allow for the testing of the 
relative contributions of these entities, even at individual levels for the largest 
emitters (Chevron, ExxonMobil, Saudi Aramco, and Gazprom).94 They are also able 
to trace increments of sea-level rise to the combustion of fossil fuel products from 
these entities, which has direct relevance to the recent cases launched in the second 
wave of climate litigation where government entities are claiming abatement costs 
for sea-level rise.95  
These new studies make great headway in closing the causation gap highlighted 
in the first wave of climate litigation. Developments in attribution science have the 
potential to “change the legal landscape,”96 leading to implications for directors with 
legal duties to consider and avoid foreseeable harm. Improvements in attribution 
science are proving foreseeability, which is key to establishing a tort-based duty of 
care.97 These studies make the connection between corporate emissions and their 
harm very clear. Evidence from attribution science will catalyze future climate 
change litigation, and may inform common law-based litigation of directors’ and 
officers’ liability.98 Indeed, despite the lack of federal legislative progress on climate 
change in the United States, a second wave of climate litigation against carbon-major 
companies has already begun in earnest, as the next Section discusses. While cases 
                                                   
92 B. Ekwurzel et al., The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO2 Surface Temperature, and 
Sea Level from Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 579, 
585 (2017). 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 582, 586–88 (noting three sources of uncertainty: equilibrium climate 
sensitivity; the short-term effects of fossil fuel aerosols; and the policy relevance of different 
time periods of historical emissions). 
95 Id. at 586–88 (clarifying that their work is not designed to assign responsibility, an 
issue which they reserve for societal judgment). They do acknowledge that the tools of 
attribution science are being applied to characterize specific damages resulting from specific 
players in anthropogenic climate change, and therefore societal judgments should be 
informed by the ongoing scientific analysis. 
96 Marjanac et al., supra note 25, at 616. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (noting that probabilistic evidence is already accepted in U.K. occupational 
exposure to toxic substances cases where causation has been proved when the evidence 
demonstrates a ‘doubling-of-the-risk’ test, that the risk was increased by a factor of 2:1); see 
e.g., XYZ v. Schering [2002] EWHC 1420 (UK); Sienkiewicz v. Greif [2011] UKSC 10 
(UK). 
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in the first wave were unsuccessful, cases in the second wave are using multiple 
legal tools and attempting to scale the hurdles encountered in the first wave of 
litigation. In addition, judges in these cases are demonstrating more willingness to 
acknowledge and manage climate science. 
 
C.  The Second Wave of Climate Litigation: Hurdling the Hurdles 
 
A number of new suits were launched primarily by government actors in 2017 
and 2018 in the United States and around the world. In this second wave, climate 
litigation is taking a variety of forms, including using tort law, public and private 
nuisance, human rights, and the public trust doctrine.99 Newer cases against 
corporations have also employed fiduciary duty and security law disclosure 
requirements or statutory offenses,100 highlighting a turn to corporate law in the 
second wave of litigation. Litigants in the second wave are also attempting to 
overcome the federal displacement hurdle by citing state-based claims and breaches 
of other state legislation.101 
Tort-based claims are evolving, and attribution science may be influencing both 
their initiation and outcomes.102 For example, in 2017, a case in Germany, RWE v 
Lliuya, found the possibility of a causal and proximate relationship between the 
emissions of a German energy company, RWE, and climate damage experienced in 
Peru.103 The plaintiff cited Heede’s calculations that RWE was responsible for 
                                                   
99 Preston, (Part 1), supra note 38, at 4; Preston, (Part 2), supra note 38, at 258; Blumm 
&Wood, supra note 38, at 73–83. 
100 For example, New York’s Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352–353 (McKinney 
2019) has been relied up on by the Attorney General of New York to investigate and sue 
ExxonMobil. See Decision and Order at 2, People of the State of New York v. ExxonMobil 
Corporation, No. 451962 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 2016). The Martin Act is a New York anti-
fraud law which provides the Attorney General with expansive powers of investigation into 
securities fraud. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352–353. In December 2019 the court ruled 
against New York on its Martin Act claim against Exxon. See John Schwartz, New York 
Loses Climate Change Fraud Case Against Exxon Mobil, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://nyti.ms/2sdIAYF [https://perma.cc/8BWX-YJFC].  
101 See supra notes 9–17. 
102 Weaver & Kysar, supra note 38, at 339 (arguing that courts should be re-examining 
the parameters of tort law considering the catastrophic impacts of climate change).  
103 See Lliuya v. RWE AG, CLIMATE CASES CHART, http://climatecasechart.com/non-
us-case/lliuya-v-rwe-ag/ [https://perma.cc/W8TF-7DHZ] (last visited Oct. 8, 2019); see also 
Stefan Küper, Higher Regional Court Hamm: Large Emitters Can Be Held Liable for 
Climate Change Impacts, GERMANWATCH, (Nov. 13, 2017), https://germanwatch.org/en/14 
702 [https://perma.cc/V5YE-29FM]. Mr. Lliuya’s house sits downhill of a glacial lake, Lake 
Palcococha. Mr. Lliuya alleged that the volume of the lake has increased from 10 m³ in the 
1930s to 17.3 m³ in 2016, with glacial melt directly contributing to its increased volume. He 
also alleged that his home is vulnerable to glacial outbursts—inundations of the natural 
moraine dams surrounding the lake that would lead to flood waves, possibly reaching over 3 
meters. See Landgericht [LG] [Essen District Court] Dec. 15, 2016, 2vOv285/15 (Ger.), 
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0.47% of all historic emissions, and therefore asked for 0.47% of the total costs of 
remediation actions taken in Peru.104 On appeal, the Appellate Hamm Court agreed 
with the plaintiffs, provisionally accepting arguments that it was sufficient that RWE 
was partially responsible for the flood risk.105 The case was able to overcome, at 
least in principle, one of the most intractable legal hurdles to date in terms of tort-
based actions against corporations: causation. The civil law jurisdiction of Germany 
is far removed from common law jurisdictions, such as the United States, and the 
case may remain an outlier for some time. Despite this, the outcome of the RWE 
case demonstrates that some jurisdictions are willing to base their decisions on new 
scientific processes and illustrates how the evolution of climate science could affect 
future U.S. lawsuits.  
 
D.  Managing Climate Science 
 
In 2017 and 2018, government entities launched suits against a number of 
carbon-major corporations. While most of these cases are still at their procedural or 
initial substantive stages, issues of causation and federal versus state jurisdiction 
have already been implicated. This second wave of cases can be divided into two 
                                                   
translation in CLIMATE CASES CHART, http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-
litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2016/20161215_Case-No.-
2-O-28515-Essen-Regional-Court_decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9JV-9PY4] (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2020) [hereinafter Lliuya v. RWE AG, Essen District Court Decision, English 
Translation]. He based his claim on paragraph 1004 of the Germany Civil Code, which deals 
with interference with property. See id. 
104 See Lliuya v. RWE AG, Essen District Court Decision, English Translation, supra 
note 103. Mr. Lliuya alleged that his abatement costs requested amounted to approximately 
€17,000 (approximately USD$19,000). Id. The first decision in the District Court of Essen 
dismissed the claim for the usual tort-based causation hurdles. The District Court stated that 
the lack of precision made the claim inadmissible, and RWE’s contribution to climate change 
was not sufficient to establish legal causality, citing the lack of linear causality between a 
particular source and particularized damage. Id. Similar to AEP, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. 
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), the court also mentioned that every living person is an 
emitter, and referred to the chain of causation as “scientifically disputed.” Id. 
105 Lliuya v. RWE AG, CLIMATE CASE CHART, supra note 103. The case will now move 
on to the evidentiary phase, and the court has requested expert evidence in two areas: that 
the flood/mudslide resulting from expansion of water posed serious threats to Mr. Lliuya’s 
property, and whether RWE’s emissions rose into the atmosphere and according to the laws 
of physics led to higher concentrations of GHGs in the Earth’s atmosphere. Id.  
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groups, the first brought by the cities of New York,106 Oakland, and San Francisco,107 
which have made a more limited set of claims and where initial substantive decisions 
have already been made. The second group of claims has been brought by a number 
of cities and counties in California, as well as other government entities around the 
United States,108 based on a broader set of claims but where no substantive decisions 
have yet been made. 
In the first group of cases, New York City claimed, in federal court, that the 
City had incurred, and would continue to incur, substantial costs due to climate 
change, and that the largest five fossil fuel companies should be responsible for these 
costs as they were responsible for approximately 11% of carbon and methane 
pollution and had downplayed the risks of climate change.109 New York’s claim was 
sited upon both public and private nuisance law, as well as illegal trespass due to 
sea-level rise. In July 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York granted a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant companies on the basis that 
federal common law governed the City’s claims, as they were based on transnational 
emissions, and their claims were displaced by the Clean Air Act and presented 
nonjusticiable political questions.110 The case demonstrates how difficult a hurdle 
the federal displacement issue is to overcome. 
In the Oakland and San Francisco cases, the plaintiffs filed suit in state court 
against the same five carbon-major corporations, seeking abatement, not damages, 
for the costs to them of adapting to sea-level rise induced by climate change on the 
basis of public nuisance.111 One of the more interesting aspects of the case was that, 
after the cases were consolidated and removed by the defendants to federal court, 
the judge ordered a tutorial on climate change that took place in March 2018. Judge 
Alsup requested specific information on the history of the scientific study on climate 
change, as well as on the best science now available on global warming, glacial melt, 
                                                   
106 See generally City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(detailing litigation action from the City of New York against the collective defendants for 
the general affects they have had on the environment), appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. 
argued Nov. 22, 2019). 
107 City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(dismissing Oaklands and San Francisco’s public nuisance action), appeal pending, No. 18-
16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020). 
108 Complaint at 75–94, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., C17-01227 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. July 17, 2017), Doc. 1; Complaint at 95–118, City of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp., 
18-cv-0458 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2017), Doc 1; Complaint at 90–111, City of Richmond 
v. Chevron Corp., C 18-00055 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2018), Doc. 1; Complaint at 78–97, 
Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 17-CIV-03222 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 2017) Doc. 1; 
Complaint at 79–98, Cty. of Marin v. Chevron Corp., CIV-17-02586 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 
17, 2017), Doc 1; see also infra Section II.C. 
109 City of New York v. BP, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 471. 
110 Id. at 471–72. An appeal is currently pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, and oral arguments were held in November 2019. City of New York v. BP 
P.L.C., No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. argued Nov. 22, 2019).  
111 City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1021, 1024. 
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sea rise, and coastal flooding.112 The request for a scientific tutorial in a federal 
lawsuit was called “unprecedented.”113 This innovative approach to climate science 
may usher in a new approach in U.S. cases of judicial assessment and 
acknowledgment of climate science, including attribution science. The case 
demonstrated a more sophisticated judicial approach to climate science than was 
demonstrated in the first wave of climate litigation. 
Judge Alsup’s understanding of climate science is reflected in the judgment, 
which clearly stated that the case was not about climate science but about the law, 
“whether these producers of fossil fuels should pay for anticipated harm that will 
eventually flow from a rise in sea level.”114 Ultimately, his answer was no, and the 
court dismissed the claim in June 2018, based on a number of grounds, including the 
federal displacement doctrine, and that the issue was largely a political one.115 The 
court also applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of public nuisance: 
an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.116 Whether 
the interference was unreasonable under the Restatement’s test depended in part on 
weighing the harm of the conduct against the utility of the conduct. Judge Alsup 
found that it was necessary to consider the social value of fossil fuels, which 
outweighed the harm of the conduct.117 The Oakland judgment illustrates that, in 
this second wave of climate litigation against corporations, judges are able and 
willing to assess complex climate science. But the case also illustrates that both the 
federal displacement doctrine, combined with judicial reluctance to adjudicate 
corporate climate harms, is alive and well in U.S. jurisprudence against carbon-
major corporations and will remain a stumbling block in federal common law 
claims.118 
In both the New York City and the Oakland and San Francisco cases, the courts 
rejected the plaintiffs’ attempts to invoke state common law to avoid the federal 
displacement doctrine. In City of New York, the court noted that the “City has not 
                                                   
112 Id.; see also California v. BP P.L.C., No. C-17-06011 WHA and No. C-17-06012 
WHA (Feb. 27, 2018) (Notice Re Tutorial). Both Chevron’s lead attorney and Myles Allen 
for the plaintiff (and co-author of the original attribution study in 2004), presented to the 
judge. Chevron’s attorney stated that the company acknowledged that humans are playing a 
major role in climate change, but instead his presentation focused on the scientific 
uncertainty in the IPCC AR5 reports, particularly around sea-level rise. The roles of 
population growth and economic development were also stressed. See Warren Cornwall, In 
a San Francisco Courtroom, Climate Science Gets Its Day on the Docket, SCI. MAG. (Mar. 
22, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/03/san-francisco-court-room-
climate-science-gets-its-day-docket [https://perma.cc/9ZL7-473U]. 
113 Cornwall, supra note 112. 
114 City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1022. 
115 Id. at 1024. 
116 Id. at 1024 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (AM. LAW INST., 
1979)). 
117 Id. at 1023. 
118 The case has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. 
18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020). 
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sued under New York law,” and its claims were properly analyzed as federal 
common law claims and were therefore displaced by the Clean Air Act.119 In 
contrast, the plaintiffs in Oakland expressly brought their original claims under 
California public nuisance law and in state court, but the defendants nevertheless 
successfully removed the case to federal court and convinced the federal judge that 
federal common law governed the claims.120 In denying the plaintiffs’ motion to 
remand the case to the state level,121 Judge Alsup commented that if ever a problem 
“cried out for a uniform and comprehensive solution” at the federal level, it is 
climate change.122 The lack of success in the attempts by Oakland, San Francisco, 
and New York to invoke state law was a fatal flaw for the initial substantive 
decisions in this first group of cases and has been taken into account by litigants the 
second group of cases. Most of the claims in the second group specifically ground 
their actions in a wider set of claims, including state-based common law and 
statutes.123  
 
E.  Avoiding Federal Displacement 
 
The second group of cases brought by California cities and counties attempts 
to avoid the federal displacement doctrine by making a more diverse set of claims 
grounded in state law, including public and private nuisance, strict liability for 
failure to warn customers of the dangers of climate change, design defect, 
negligence, and trespass.124 These suits were patterned more closely on tobacco and 
                                                   
119 City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal 
pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. argued Nov. 22, 2019). 
120 City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1021. 
121 Id. 
122 Order Denying Motion to Remand at 4, ¶ 26, California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-
06011 WHA and No. C 17-06012 WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018). 
123 See Complaint at 75–94, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. C17-01227 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 2017), Doc. 1; Complaint at 99–122, Cty. of Santa Cruz v. Chevron 
Corp., No. 17-cv-03242 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2017), Doc. 1; First Amend. Complaint at 
89–94, King Cty. v. BP P.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-00758-RSL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2018), Doc. 
113; Complaint at 115–139, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. 
Ct., Providence/Bristol Cty., July 2, 2018); Complaint at 107–129, Mayor of Baltimore v. 
BP P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore City, July 20, 2018). 
124 See supra note 123. New York City had also framed their claim as being based on 
the sales and production of fossil fuels, rather than emissions, but the court rejected this. See 
City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that 
New York’s climate nuisance claims were displaced, reasoning that “regardless of the 
manner in which the City frames its claims . . . the City is seeking damages for global-
warming related injuries resulting from greenhouse gas emissions, and not only the 
production of Defendants’ fossil fuels”). The original complaint in Rhode Island v. Chevron 
Corp. cites the percentage of total emissions that the defendants as a group are responsible 
for from the years 1965 to 2015 and, while the plaintiffs acknowledge no linear causation is 
possible, the claim states that attribution to each defendant of a quantifiable amount of carbon 
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asbestos litigation.125 In both the tobacco and asbestos litigation, products that were 
later understood to create severe health and environmental risks, and where product 
manufacturers both knew and attempted to disguise the risks of their products, 
attracted liability. In the tobacco litigation, tobacco company defendants adopted a 
“scorched earth”126 litigation strategy, vigorously defending all of the suits against 
them. Even though the original tobacco litigation suits were unsuccessful, the 
litigation inspired legislative changes and eventually led to successful litigation.127 
Analogies can also be drawn with litigation recently launched by cities, counties, 
and states’ attorneys general against manufacturers and distributors of opioids.128 A 
                                                   
emissions is possible, therefore allowing attribution of ambient air and ocean temperatures, 
as well as sea-level rise, in response to those emissions on an individual and aggregate basis. 
See Complaint at 4, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 
2, 2018). This is the first time specific attribution science for specified temperature increases 
and sea-level rise has been cited in a case against a carbon major entity in the United States. 
However, unlike in City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., the judge in Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp. 
has not requested a “climate tutorial.” Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142 
(D. R.I. 2019) (Order Granting Motion to Remand). 
125 See generally Olszynski et al., supra note 21 (tracking the similarities between 
tobacco and climate litigation and noting that tobacco norms that evolved over time closely 
tied to evolving scientific understandings of tobacco’s impacts on human health). Olszynski 
et al. describe the “scorched earth” approach that tobacco companies initially adopted in 
responding to personal injury litigation. The initial tobacco suits by plaintiffs all failed, in 
part due to tobacco’s vigorous litigation strategies which denied the impact of smoking on 
human health. However, as the link between smoking and lung cancer evolved, so did 
corporate strategies, shifting to personal responsibility defenses. Olszynski et al. look a 
decade into the future, characterized by mounting climate damages and in that context 
highlight the similarities between tobacco litigation and climate litigation against carbon 
major corporations. Id. at 10-21; see also Ganguly et al., supra note 21, at 17 (noting that 
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006) demonstrated that 
governments could recover health and environmental related costs). Similarities with 
asbestos litigation can also be noted. Pursuant to Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Ltd. [2002] 
UKHL 22, a leading U.K. torts case, a plaintiff who contracted asbestos while working for 
different employers was able to recover from one defendant on the basis of joint and several 
liability, because the defendant had materially increased the risk of harm, even though the 
plaintiff was unable to pinpoint which employer had directly caused the harm. See also David 
A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change 
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22–31 (2003); Michael Gerrard, What Litigation of a 
Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 11, 12–14, 56 
(2012).  
126 Olszynski et al., supra note 21, at 10. 
127 Gerrard, supra note 125, at 18; Olszynski supra note 21, at 12–14; Douglas Kysar, 
Fossil Fuel Industry’s ‘Tobacco Moment’ Has Arrived, YALE L. SCH. (July 28 2017), 
https://law.yale.edu/fossil-fuel-industrys-tobacco-moment-has-arrived [https://perma.cc/C4 
A5-55DR]. 
128 Nicole Fisher, Opioid Lawsuits on Par to Become Largest Civil Litigation 
Agreement in U.S. History, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2018, 6:52 PM), 
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key distinction between all of these other litigation efforts and climate litigation is 
the widespread use and reliance on fossil fuels for global development, and this issue 
was key to Judge Alsup’s decision in the Oakland and San Francisco dismissal.129  
Despite these numerous hurdles, some Californian cities and counties have 
been procedurally successful at having their claims heard at the state and not the 
federal level. For example, Judge Chhabria in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California agreed to remand County of San Mateo v. Chevron 
Corp., to the state level.130 In his order, Judge Chhabria noted that AEP did not 
resolve the issue of whether state law claims were preempted by federal statutes 
such as the Clean Air Act.131 In his view, once federal common law is displaced by 
a federal statute, it is no longer possible that state law claims could be superseded 
by federal common law. In other words, federal law does not preclude the plaintiffs 
from asserting state law claims. Further, according to Judge Chhabria, federal law 
does not govern the plaintiffs’ claim, and therefore this case could avoid the federal 
displacement doctrine.132 The decision cites only a few instances where federal law 
will preclude state law, and only narrow circumstances justify removing a state law 
case to federal court.133 
                                                   
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolefisher/2018/10/18/opioid-lawsuits-on-par-to-become-
largest-civil-litigation-agreement-in-u-s-history/ [https://perma.cc/RV5D-4FEF]; Joanna 
Walters, Sackler Family Members Face Mass Litigation and Criminal Investigations over 
Opioid Crisis, GUARDIAN, (Nov. 19, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/nov/19/sackler-family-members-face-mass-litigation-criminal-investigations-
over-opioids-crisis [https://perma.cc/UR2P-WPVW] (noting the Sackler family which own 
Purdue Pharma, one of the manufacturers of OxyContin, is facing class action litigation); 
Cassandra Bassler, Suffolk County Sues Purdue Pharma Family over Opioids, NPR NEWS 
(Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.wshu.org/post/suffolk-county-sues-purdue-pharma-family-
over-opioids#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/U8U7-AZBV]. 
129 City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“The 
scope of plaintiffs’ theory is breathtaking. It would reach the sale of fossil fuels anywhere in 
the world, including all past and otherwise lawful sales, where the seller knew that the 
combustion of fossil fuels contributed to the phenomenon of global warming.”), appeal 
pending, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020). 
130 Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal 2018), 
appeal filed sub nom., Cty. of Marin v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-15503 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 
2018).  
131 Cty. of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937.  
132 Id. 
133 The opinion cites instances of “complete pre-emption” by a specified federal statute. 
Id. It also cites the Grable jurisdiction as requiring the defendants to cite specific instances 
of federal law. Id. at 938. The opinion also notes that the savings clause in the Clean Air Act 
“preserve[s] state causes of action and suggest[s] that Congress did not intend federal causes 
of action . . . ‘to be exclusive.’” Id. at 938 (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. §7604(e) 
(2018) (Clean Air Act Savings Clause). The Clean Water Act contains a similar savings 
clause. See 33 U.S.C. §§1365(e), 1370 (2018).  
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The County of San Mateo opinion provides important insights into how other 
claims made against carbon-major corporations in the second group of cases, and 
also future cases, may be decided. In 2018, U.S. states and cities filed several new 
suits that have not yet resulted in orders or judgments. In April 2018, the Board of 
County Commissioners of Boulder County, Colorado, along with the City of 
Boulder, initiated several claims against carbon-major companies for public and 
private nuisance, trespass, deceptive trade practices, and violations of the Colorado 
Consumer Protection Act.134 In May 2018, King County in Washington State filed a 
suit against the five largest fossil fuel corporations for coastal harms, flooding, storm 
surge and decreased mountain snowpack.135 In July 2018, the State of Rhode Island 
and the Mayor and City of Baltimore filed similar suits against fossil fuel companies 
citing public and private nuisance, strict liability for failure to warn and design 
defect, negligence design defect, and breaches of the Rhode Island State 
Environmental Rights Act136 and Maryland Consumer Protection Act.137 Litigants in 
this second group are clearly responding to the failure of the first wave and crafting 
their pleadings more directly to invoke state law.  
In all of these cases, the corporate defendants submitted motions (with varying 
degrees of success) to remove the cases to federal court on the grounds that they 
involved a significant question of federal common law and federal energy law 
policies.138 Federal preemption of state law claims is likely to be a significant issue 
                                                   
134 Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 405 F. 
Supp. 3d 947, 954–55 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-1330 (10th Cir. Sept. 9, 
2019). This case was filed in Colorado state court in April 2018. First Complaint, Board of 
Cty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., No. 2018CV30349 (Dist. Ct., 
Cty. of Boulder, Colo., filed April 17, 2018). However, the case was removed by the 
defendants to federal court in June 2018. Notice of Removal, Board of Cty. Comm’rs of 
Boulder Cty., 405 F. Supp. 3d at 954 (No. 1:18-cv-01672). In September 2019, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Colorado granted the Plaintiff’s motion to remand to state 
court. Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cty., 405 F. Supp. 3d at 954. For a full history of 
this case, see Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), 
Inc., SABIN CTR., http://climatecasechart.com/case/board-of-county-commissioners-of-
boulder-county-v-suncor-energy-usa-inc/ [https://perma.cc/VT9M-FCYH] (last visited Nov. 
10, 2019).  
135 First Amended Complaint at 1, King Cty. V. BP P.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-00758-RSL 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2018) Doc. 113. 
136 Complaint at 115–139, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. 
Super. Ct., Providence/Bristol Cty., filed July 2, 2018). 
137 Complaint, Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct., 
Baltimore City, filed July 20, 2018). In addition, in November 2018 a group of crab 
fishermen in California sued 30 oil and gas companies for damage to their livelihoods due to 
global warming induced algae blooms which have shortened the crab season. See Complaint 
at 1, Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., No. CGC-18-571285 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018).  
138 See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F.Supp.3d 538 (D. Md. 2019) (No. 
1:18CV02357), aff’d, No. 19-1644 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2020) (remanding from federal court to 
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in all of these cases and, therefore, a number of these cases may stand or fall together. 
In October 2018, King County was granted its request for a stay in proceedings until 
the Ninth Circuit appeal of the San Francisco and Oakland case was decided.139 In 
March 2020, the appeal by carbon-majors to remove the Baltimore suit to federal 
court was denied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s remand order that the suit remain in state court.140 
Courts in some of the recent climate cases have agreed that state common law claims 
are not completely preempted, because the Savings Clause in the Clean Air Act’s 
Citizen Suit section “preserve[s] state causes of action and suggest[s] that Congress 
did not intend federal causes of action . . . to be exclusive.”141 
While these cases are at the appellate and preliminary stages, respectively, they 
do provide evidence of a growing trend of corporate climate litigation in the United 
States—the increasing reliance on climate attribution science and state-based claims. 
Moreover, the Third Circuit case of Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station 
demonstrates that federal preemption under the Clean Air Act may not be a bar to 
state-based claims.142 This case could be applied to GHG emissions, allowing state 
common law-based claims regarding intrastate emissions, but it would likely not 
apply to interstate emissions.143 If this analysis is correct, then the federal preemption 
                                                   
state court); Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F.Supp. 3d 142, 146 (D.R.I. 2019) (No. 
1:18-cv-00395-WES-LDA) (remanding from federal court to state court). 
139 See Order Granting Partially Unopposed Motion to Stay Proceedings at 2–3, King 
Cty. v. BP P.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-00758 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2018), Doc. 138. 
140 Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 19-1644 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2020), aff’g 388 
F.Supp.3d 538 (D. Md. 2019).  
141 Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal 2018) 
(emphasis added); see also Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F.Supp.3d 538, 553–55 
(D. Md. 2019), aff’d, No. 19-1644 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2020). 
142 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1149 (2014). In Bell, a 
community surrounding a Pennsylvania power-generating station complained that fly ash 
and unburned coal settled on their property, causing a considerable nuisance. The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Clean Air Act did not preempt the plaintiffs’ 
case. The case pointed specifically to the savings clause of the Clean Air Act, which 
preserves causes of action despite the comprehensive scope of the Act, allows states to adopt 
or enforce more progressive standards for emissions, and specifically also allows citizen 
suits. Id. at 197 (discussing 42 U.S.C. §7604(e) (2012)). For an analysis of Bell, see 
generally, Samantha Caravello, Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 465 (2014) (analyzing the Third Circuit’s Decision and arguing that the decision served 
important functions).  
143 Bell followed a case revolving around the savings clause under the Clean Water Act, 
(the savings clause under the Clean Water Act is largely similar to that of the Clean Air Act), 
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987). Ouellette states that while 
the Clean Water Act’s savings clause allows states to impose higher standards on water 
sources within their borders, and individuals are not preempted from bringing claims under 
state law, it only applies to sources of pollution within that state and not to pollution sources 
within a different state. 
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hurdle will have been removed. However, the Bell case also creates difficulties. Even 
if they are successful in avoiding federal preemption, state-based claims are unlikely 
to be successful given the international and interstate nature of GHG emissions.144  
In order for these new common law tort suits to be successful on the argument 
around interstate emissions, courts and plaintiffs will likely need to take a more 
innovative approach to tort law. State tort law can fill the gap in the statutory regime 
by providing a compensatory remedy to individuals, which the Clean Air Act does 
not.145 This is illustrated by a new development in the second wave of corporate 
climate litigation—one industry suing another industry over climate impacts. In 
2018, the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Association submitted a claim 
based on public state-based nuisance, negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn 
against a number of carbon-major corporations for damage caused to their industry 
from the impacts of climate change.146 A number of academics are skeptical of the 
utility of tort law in climate litigation,147 and Kysar has suggested that climate 
change, due to its diffuse and disparate nature and effects, constitutes a 
“paradigmatic antitort.”148 However, the legally disruptive nature of climate change 
                                                   
144 For example, the district courts in the New York and Oakland cases rejected 
Plaintiffs’ attempts to avoid dismissal by arguing that emissions are occurring globally and 
are thus not entirely addressed by the Clean Air Act. The courts explained that even if the 
Clean Air Act did not displace claims alleging harm from international emissions, such 
claims would still be barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality, which counsels 
against “unwarranted judicial interference” when a claim “reaches conduct within the 
territory of another sovereign.” See City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 
1025 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 
(2013)), appeal pending, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020); see also City of New 
York v. BP, P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[T]o the extent that the City 
seeks to hold Defendants liable for damages stemming from foreign greenhouse gas 
emissions, the City’s claims are barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality . . . .”), 
appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. argued Nov. 22, 2019).  
145 Caravello, supra note 142, at 475. 
146 Complaint at 76–89, Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron 
Corp., No. CGC-18-571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018). See the full history of this case 
at Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., SABIN CTR., 
http://climatecasechart.com/case/pacific-coast-federation-of-fishermens-associations-inc-v-
chevron-corp/ [https://perma.cc/TC5R-VAKG] (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
147 See generally Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
1295 (2009) (arguing that climate change policy is made more difficult to craft due to the 
delayed effects of climate change); Laurence H. Tribe et al., Too Hot for Courts to Handle 
Fuel Temperature, Global Warming and the Political Question Doctrine (Wash. Legal 
Found. Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series No. 169, 2010), https://s3.us-east-
2.amazonaws.com/washlegal-uploads/upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_WP 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/24BJ-HGTF] (detailing a number of issues of climate change litigation 
focused around two major problems stemming from concerns about temperature and its 
chemical and climactic effects). 
148 Donald Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 
(2011). 
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could mean that tort law will evolve to take into account climate change.149 
Developments in climate science show the contributions of companies to climate 
impacts and may be sufficient to overcome causation hurdles.150  
Even if these cases are not successful, climate litigation could serve as a series 
of “prods and pleas,”151 effectively calling attention to the inadequacies of existing 
legal approaches to climate change. Kysar notes that even if climate litigation efforts 
fail, the use of tort law can contribute to a larger ecosystem of governance 
institutions, and judicial engagement helps frame litigants’ suffering and calls public 
attention to the issue.152 The effects of climate change are certainly being felt in the 
cities and states bringing the suits, with large financial consequences for government 
entities, which are having to pay for adaptation actions, even if the emissions are 
being made elsewhere.153 The international nature of emissions did not hinder the 
Court in the RWE case in Germany,154 and that case could eventually influence U.S. 
courts as well.  
International judicial decisions are referring to and relying on each other, and 
consequentially inspiring further climate litigation in other jurisdictions. Indeed, the 
plaintiffs in RWE referred to the Dutch Urgenda case, itself an example of 
“progressive legal reasoning and development” and “ambitious evolution of 
doctrine,”155 particularly in the area of causation.156 The 2015 Urgenda case neatly 
glided over the causation hurdles of past cases by stating that a sufficient causal link 
can be presumed to exist between Dutch emissions and global climate change, even 
                                                   
149 Fisher et al., supra note 39, at 190. 
150 See supra Section II.B. 
151 See generally Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limiting 
Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011) (evaluating three 
potential obstacles to merits adjudication in the context of how federal and state tort law 
interacts with climate change). 
152 Douglas A. Kysar, The Public Life of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk Regulation 
Mechanism, 9 EUR. J. RISK REG. 48, 50 (2018). 
153 See Complaint at 3–6, Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron 
Corp., No. CGC-18-571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018) (describing the deprivation of 
substantive portions of revenue for crab fisheries as well as wholesalers and processers 
during the 2015–2018 seasons, as well as indirect losses such as loss of commercial fishing 
lifestyles, identity, and loss of public confidence in the safety and quality of crab products). 
154 5. Zivilsenat des Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG] [Fifth Division for Civil Matters 
of the Higher Regional Court of Hamm] Nov. 30, 2017 (Ger.) 
155 Fisher et al., supra note 39, at 191.  
156 See The Urgenda Climate Case Against the Dutch Government, URGENDA, 
https://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case [https://perma.cc/6FS5-LCFX] (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2019). The Urgenda case was brought by a Dutch nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) claiming that the Dutch state should, by 2030, reduce its GHG emissions by at least 
25% below 1990 levels, which would achieve the proportion of emissions agreed in an EU 
burden-sharing emissions agreement. The NGO was successful, and the government 
appealed. The English translation of the case is forthcoming.  
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though Dutch emissions constitute a small fraction of global emissions.157 In October 
2018, the Hague Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that failure of the Dutch 
government to reduce its emissions to 25% below 1990 levels by 2030 would 
constitute a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights.158 The original 
decision in 2015 had already inspired similar litigation in the European Union and 
beyond,159 and the appellate decision is likely to lead to progressive regulatory 
change within the EU.  
The interaction between these judgments discussed above points to a global 
conversation carried on by courts on the issue of causation, whether through torts, 
constitutional human rights, or private law mechanisms. Whether the RWE case’s 
approach to partial causation will be relied upon in the United States or cases in other 
jurisdictions against carbon-major corporations remains to be seen. Nonetheless, it 
seems likely that, as European courts and courts in other countries hold carbon 
majors accountable, U.S. localities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 
individuals will continue to pursue claims in U.S. courts. Further, multinational 
corporations such as carbon-majors are sensitive to progressive decisions in other 
jurisdictions due to the global reach of their operations.160 Litigation risk will persist 
for carbon-majors, even if the second wave of litigation is unsuccessful.  
Beyond litigation risk, regulatory proposals are emerging. In September 2018, 
U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed the Climate Risk Disclosure Act, which 
would require disclosure to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of 
a corporation’s total fossil fuel-related assets, how those assets would be affected by 
                                                   
157 Rechtbank den Haag 24 juni 2015, m.nt. (Urgenda Foundation/The State of the 
Netherlands) (unofficial English translation) (Neth.).  
158 Hof den Haag 09 oktober 2018, m.nt. (Urgenda Foundation/The State of the 
Netherlands) (upheld by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in December 2019, No. 
HAZA C/09/456689) (Neth.).  
159 For example, in 2019, NGOs in The Netherlands sued Shell on behalf of 30,000 
people in 70 countries to legally compel them to reduce emissions. See FRIENDS OF THE 
EARTH INTERNATIONAL, Netherlands: Activists Sue Shell over Climate Change, BUSINESS & 
HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/netherlands-activists-sue-shell-over-climate-change [https://perma.cc/ 
KZL2-WRZ9] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). The Urgenda case has also inspired litigation 
around the world on similar grounds in: the United Kingdom, Plan B and Others v. Secretary 
of State for Transport (2019) EWHC 1070; France, Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v. 
France (letter of formal notice filed Dec. 17, 2018), and Commune de Grande-Synthe v. 
France (filed January 2019)); Ireland, Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. The Gov’t. 
of Ireland (decided Sept. 19, 2019); and Switzerland, Union of Swiss Senior Women for 
Climate Protection v. Swiss Federal Council and Others, No. A-2992/2017. 
160 See generally Lisa Benjamin, The Responsibilities of Corporations: New Directions 
in Environmental Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Veerle Heyveart and Leslie-Anne Duvic-Paoli eds. forthcoming, 
2020). 
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climate change, and how directors are managing climate risks to those assets.161 In 
January 2019, Rep. Deutch Theodore reintroduced the Energy Innovation and 
Carbon Dividend Act to price carbon, provide revenue to households, and reduce 
domestic greenhouse gas emissions 90 percent by 2050.162 In addition, the Green 
New Deal has attracted significant public attention. While the resolution in its 
current form is broad, it proposes a set of economic stimulus programs designed to 
address both climate change and economic inequality.163 It aims for net-zero 
emissions through decarbonizing the electricity grid, transportation systems, and 
industry.164 The Democratic Party is also considering making climate change a 
fundamental platform in the 2020 federal election in order to appeal to younger 
voters.165 These regulatory approaches would certainly provide a more 
comprehensive and systemic approach to climate change than courts can provide, 
but may be slower to emerge in the United States than in other jurisdictions.166 Even 
                                                   
161 See Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, S. 2075, 116th Cong. (2019); see also 
Karen Savage, New Bill Would Require the SEC to Police Companies’ Climate Risks, 
CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/09/ 
20/climate-risks-disclosure-sec-elizabeth-warren/ [https://perma.cc/WQD5-YSD2]. The 
recent experience with European privacy laws and data protection is also illustrative. The 
EU General Data Protection Regulation has introduced sweeping changes in the management 
of personal data, along with significant fines which may have implications for U.S. 
corporations with operations in the EU. Justin Jaffe & Laura Hautala, What the GDPR Means 
for Facebook, the EU and You, CNET.COM (May 25, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/how-
to/what-gdpr-means-for-facebook-google-the-eu-us-and-you/ [https://perma.cc/3YES-
QRDR]. 
162 H.R. Res. 763, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Steve Valk, Climate Action: Bipartisan 
Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Bill Reintroduced in Congress, RED GREEN & 
BLUE (Jan. 24, 2019), http://redgreenandblue.org/2019/01/24/climate-action-bipartisan-
energy-innovation-carbon-dividend-bill-reintroduced-congress [https://perma.cc/L62C-
FGK7]. 
163 H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019) (“Recognizing the duty of the federal 
government to create a green new deal”); Lisa Friedman, What Is the Green New Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/climate/green-new-deal-
questions-answers.html [https://perma.cc/G74T-8EUN].  
164 Id.  
165 Coral Davenport & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pressed by Climate Activists, Senate 
Democrats Plan to ‘Go on Offense,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/politics/senate-democrats-climate-change.html 
[https://perma.cc/6QHF-9F24]. 
166 A comprehensive treatment of state and federal action on climate change is beyond 
the scope of this Article, but it is clear that, despite existing federal hurdles on climate 
regulation, regulatory action is occurring at the state and local levels. For example, Colorado 
updated its Climate Action Plan in 2018, incorporating a 2017 Executive Order’s goal to 
reduce GHG emissions by 26% by 2025. See H.B. 1261 (codified at COLO REV. STAT. §25-
7-102 (2019) (updating original 2007 version); see also Colorado Climate Plan 2018 
Update- State Level Policies and Strategies to Mitigate and Adapt, ADAPTATION 
CLEARINGHOUSE (July 2018), https://www.adaptationclearinghouse.org/resources/colorado-
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if this second wave of climate litigation faces setbacks or missteps, its effects, 
combined with the changing balance of the risks of climate change to corporations, 
will still be felt within corporate law.  
 
III.  NEW RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CORPORATE ACTORS 
 
The impacts of climate change are increasing, and, with them, the risks to 
corporations are rising. Climate impacts and risks entail financial costs for 
corporations, but climate change also provides opportunities to corporations through 
a transition to clean energy. Private law can make substantive contributions to 
climate change and the global energy transition away from fossil fuels. Corporate 
directors’ duties are purposefully open-textured and able to advance and change 
depending on evolving industry norms and standards.167 Increasing climate impacts 
have implications for the interpretation of fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties remain 
“largely agnostic” on climate change, allowing directors and officers significant 
flexibility in how they approach transitions away from fossil fuels.168 Fiduciary 
                                                   
climate-plan-2018-update-state-level-policies-and-strategies-to-mitigate-and-adapt.html 
[https://perma.cc/M5AX-FWM8] (explaining the update to Colorado’s 2007 Climate Plan). 
In addition, North Carolina plans to cut GHG emissions by 40% by 2025. Governor of N.C. 
Exec. Order No. 80, N.C.’s Commitment to Address Climate Change & Transition to a Clean 
Energy Economy (Oct. 29, 2018); see also Climate Change, N.C. DEPT. OF ENVTL. QUALITY, 
https://deq.nc.gov/energy-climate/climate-change [https://perma.cc/UV68-UZ2R] (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2019). Oregon has committed to reducing GHG emissions by 10% below 
1990 levels by 2020, and by 75% below 1990 levels by 2050. OR. REV. STAT. §468A.205 
(2019); see also Accelerating Efficiency in Oregon’s Built Environment to Reduce 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Address Climate Change, Or. Exec. Order 17-20 (2017), 
https://www.oregon.gov/gov/Documents/executive_orders/eo_17-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
23X3-PPUW]. Moreover, California has also adopted a goal of transitioning to 100% clean 
electricity power by 2045. See Camila Domonoske, California Sets Goal of 100 Percent 
Clean Electric Power by 2045, NPR (Sept. 10, 2018, 3:59 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/646373423/california-sets-goal-of-100-percent-renewable 
-electric-power-by-2045 [https://perma.cc/B8T9-H3FN]. California also has a statutory 
commitment to reduce the state’s emissions by 40% below 1990 levels by the year 2030, 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38566 (West 2017), as well as a comprehensive set of 
climate change legislation. See California Climate Change Legislation, CALIFORNIA 
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://www.climatechange.ca.gov/state/legislation.html [https://perma. 
cc/6WB8-5E69] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). For a list of resources on state and municipal 
climate action, see State and Local Climate Change Resource Center, SABIN CTR. FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE L., http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/archived-materials/state-
and-local-climate-change-resource-center/ [https://perma.cc/L24C-59KU] (last visited Sept. 
29, 2019). 
167 Joan M. Hemingway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes, 
Decisional Law and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 947 (2017) 
(explaining broad definition of corporate director’s duties in Delaware, the Model Business 
Corporations Act, and across other states). 
168 Hari M. Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, 94 IND. L. J. 595, 638 (2019). 
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duties provide directors with sufficient flexibility to accommodate climate risks. 
Directors have obligations to both assess and keep informed of risks to their 
business, and consequentially to share this information with investors.  
 
A.  Increasing Climate Risks for Carbon-Majors 
 
Climate change and the failure of mitigation and adaptation efforts taken 
together consistently rank in the top five global risks assessed by the World 
Economic Forum in the past several years.169 The risks of climate change are 
estimated to impact a significant portion of global assets, negatively impacting 
global fiscal stability, with up to 30% of global manageable assets at risk.170 Between 
now and the end of the century, this could lead to between four to forty-three trillion 
dollars’ worth of assets at risk.171  
Climate risk can be separated into two main categories for corporations: (1) the 
risks of transitioning to a lower-carbon economy, which may involve policy or 
regulatory changes, as well as litigation, technology, market changes, and 
reputational risks; and (2) the physical risks to operational assets of businesses, 
which may be both acute and event-driven, as well as chronic, due to slow impacts 
of climate change such as sea-level rise.172 In terms of the physical risks of climate 
change, the Fourth National Climate Assessment has estimated that “[m]ore frequent 
and intense extreme weather [events] and climate-related events” will “continue to 
damage infrastructure,” property, and labor productivity, and in the energy arena 
will reduce the efficiency of power generation.173 Climate impacts will also affect 
U.S. trade and the broader economy, disrupting operations and supply chains both 
domestically and internationally, with annual losses in some economic sectors 
reaching the hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of the century.174  
While climate change threatens a wide variety of industries, the energy and 
fossil fuel industries are particularly vulnerable. The energy infrastructures of 
productive, refinement- and distribution-focused corporations are often located in 
                                                   
169 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2018 2, Fig. I (13th ed. 
2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A9V-
62AG] (ranking failure of climate change adaptation and mitigation fifth out of top ten global 
risks in terms of likelihood, and fourth in top ten risks in terms of impact in 2018). 
170 Global manageable assets are the total stock of assets held by non-bank financial 
institutions. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 29, at 8. 
171 Id. at 2; Allie Goldstein et al., The Private Sector’s Climate Change Risk and 
Adaptation Blind Spots, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 18, 18 (2018).  
172 TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, supra note 30, at 5–
6. 
173 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE 
ASSESSMENT: VOLUME II IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES ii, 26 
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coastal areas and are vulnerable to sea-level rise, storm surges, and flooding.175 
Decreased water and power supplies will also affect energy companies that rely on 
these resources for the extraction and exploitation of fossil fuels.176 Their employees 
and customers will also be negatively affected.177  
Climate change also poses a new and intensified set of risks for the fossil fuel 
industry from government policies and legislation, financial restrictions by lenders 
and insurers, and hostile legal and shareholder actions.178 These companies can 
expect increased asset devaluations and increasing insurance and commodity 
costs.179 They are also facing changing geopolitical conditions with declining 
fortunes of petrostates, and challenges from new technology.180 Financial risks are 
also increasing, from stranded assets, divestment, and reduced wealth of fossil fuel 
exporting countries, with investor-owned firms in the developed world likely to feel 
the impacts of these cumulative risks sooner.181  
The risks of climate change are not distant future risks; carbon-majors are 
feeling the effects of climate change now. Natural disasters in 2017 in the United 
States caused over $300 billion in damage nationwide, with effects being felt acutely 
in Texas and Florida.182 Energy companies operating in the Gulf of Mexico were 
particularly badly hit and continue to be worried about extreme events.183 Melting 
permafrost in the Artic also disrupts transportation routes, therefore limiting 
operating capacity and increasing operational costs for extractive corporations 
                                                   
175 Id. at 30–31. 
176 Id. at 192–93. 
177 Id. at 30. 
178 Krane, supra note 49, at 2–3. 
179 Perry Wallace, Climate Change, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate Law Duties, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 757, 759 (2009). 
180 Krane, supra note 49, at 2. 
181 Id. (noting, however, that risks will be felt at different time scales across the fossil 
fuel industry with coal companies feeling the impacts sooner, and oil industry later as fewer 
substitutes are available and transportation will continue to rely on oil). 
182 CDP, STATE BY STATE: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. COMPANIES AND CITIES ACROSS 
SEVEN STATES 4 (Dec. 2018), https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03 
fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/003/940/original/CDP_State_by_S
tate_2018.pdf?1547134684 [https://perma.cc/5J8K-RG23]. 
183 Id. Noble Energy stated that the financial impacts of extreme weather events and 
damages would not be fully recoverable for its operations in the Gulf due to insufficient 
insurance and could negatively impact revenue. Dipka Bhambhani, Energy Companies 
Could Feel the Effects of Climate Change on Their Bottom Lines, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2018, 
1:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dipkabhambhani/2018/10/25/energy-companies-
feel-the-effects-of-climate-change-where-it-hurts-the-bottom-line/#69cd1a952199 [https:// 
perma.cc/H4YU-EYK3]. ExxonMobil incurred $135 million dollars of costs due to property 
damage caused by flood debris damaging a pipeline under Yellowstone river in Montana. 
Matthew Brown, Oil Spill: Yellowstone Spill to Cost Exxon $135M, BILLINGS GAZETTE 
(Nov. 4, 2011), https://billingsgazette.com/news/local/yellowstone-spill-to-cost-exxon-
m/article_b231f3f4-0726-11e1-ada7-001cc4c03286.html [https://perma.cc/KFS2-NFNH]. 
 
350 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
onshore.184 Risks extend internationally as well for these corporations with capital 
intensive operating structures and assets situated in some of the most vulnerable 
parts of the world to climate change.185 While energy companies are some of the 
most exposed to climate risk, they demonstrate limited recognition, at least publicly, 
to physical and other climate risks.186 
The assumption that companies are failing to account for climate risk has been 
borne out by quantitative research by Goldstein looking at 1,630 large companies’ 
voluntary reporting on climate change to investors.187 The report concludes that 
companies were not adequately characterizing climate risk in their voluntary 
reporting or adequately preparing for its impacts.188 The authors found that the 
potential magnitude of the financial impacts of climate risk was a key blind spot for 
companies.189 Directors and managers were also failing to account for indirect and 
systemic characteristics of climate risk.190 Companies are focusing only on a narrow 
view of climate risk, perhaps in part due to a predisposition to short-term thinking, 
the tendency to heavily discount future costs, and the potential of disclosure of 
climate risks to lead to a corporate disadvantage in the short term.191 Short-term 
thinking is cited as one of the most entrenched barriers to progressive climate action 
by corporations.192 However, climate change is posing both risks and opportunities 
for corporations, and new research points to opportunities, even for carbon-majors, 
in the transition away from fossil fuels, as discussed in the next section. 
  
                                                   
184 Bhambhani, supra note 183. It should also be noted that while climate change may 
be limiting onshore drilling, climate change is also breaking up arctic sea ice and opening up 
new opportunities for offshore drilling in the Arctic. 
185 ANDREW HOWARD & MARC HASSLER, SCHRODERS, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE 
FORGOTTEN PHYSICAL RISKS 2 (July 2018), https://www.schroders.com/en/sysglobalassets/ 
_global-shared-blocks/climate-change/physical-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WNW-
Q4MA]. 
186 Id.  
187 Goldstein et al., supra note 171, at 18. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. It should be noted that the insurance industry has been one of the first-movers on 
climate action, due to their high exposure. See, e.g., ALLIANZ GROUP & WORLD WILDLIFE 
FUND, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 3 (2006), http://www.climateneeds.umd.edu/pdf/AllianzWWF 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSQ7-MALT]. 
190 Goldstein et al., supra note 171, at 20–21, 23. While the authors focused only on 
physical risks, they compared the estimated price tag of climate change in the trillions of 
dollars with the aggregate financial risks reported from companies which only amounted to 
tens of billions of dollars. Id. at 20. 
191 Id. at 23. 
192 Infra Section IV.B. 
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B.  Increasing Climate Opportunities for Carbon-Majors  
 
Even for carbon-major corporations, energy transitions away from fossil fuels 
can be profitable. A recent report by Goldman Sachs highlights the opportunities of 
a transition to a low carbon economy for global energy markets, and in particular, 
for ‘Big Oils,’ being the largest carbon-major corporations.193  
The report anticipates that as a result of a lack of funding from financial 
institutions for oil and gas projects in the near future, as well as key parts of the oil 
value chain becoming stranded assets, the market in oil and gas will tighten.194 The 
report notes that, in the short-term, tightening financial conditions for hydrocarbons 
may lead to higher returns for Big Oils as they consolidate their grip on this industry; 
however, in the longer-term, the report argues that this funding could be used by Big 
Oils to convert their business to Big Energy.195 This could be achieved by leveraging 
their competitive advantages in global supply chain management, technical 
expertise, and global footprints to replicate vertical integration in energy by 
purchasing utilities and providing energy from diversified sources, including 
biofuels and renewables.196 Most importantly, this report highlights the business case 
for transition, stating that the blended returns on these new investments could be 
materially higher than returns in the past decade on just oil and gas.197  
The second wave of litigation also highlights the risks of climate change to 
investors in these corporations. Armed with more and better information about 
climate risk, investors could also put increased pressure on directors to act on the 
financial risks and opportunities posed by climate change. A recent report from 
Wood Mckenzie connects increasing pressure from investors for transparency 
regarding emissions to capital market responses.198 The report notes that investors 
will increasingly seek new instruments for green social investments. Combined with 
drivers of the transition to renewables and electrification of transport, the report 
estimates that a “point of singularity” will emerge in 2035, where the global energy 
                                                   
193 See generally GOLDMAN SACHS, RE-IMAGINING BIG OILS HOW ENERGY COMPANIES 
CAN SUCCESSFULLY ADAPT TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2018), https://www.goldmansachs.com/ 
insights/pages/reports/re-imagining-big-oils-f/re-imagining-big-oils-report-pdf.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/GX4L-FN4W] (explaining the role that Big Oil has in producing greenhouse gas 
emissions and detailing ways that Big Oil can help with de-carbonization). 
194 Id. at 15. Although it should be noted that in the natural gas industry U.S. markets 
are flooded and prices are expected to stay low for some time. Ryan Dezember, U.S. Glut in 
Natural-Gas Supply Goes Global, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2019, 3:11 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-glut-in-natural-gas-supply-goes-global-11566907200 
[https://perma.cc/J3Q9-A6XY]. 
195 GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 193, at 3.  
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 WOOD MACKENZIE, THINKING GLOBAL ENERGY TRANSITIONS: THE WHAT, IF, HOW 
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transition away from fossil fuels will be unstoppable and new energy sources will 
become the dominant choice for investments.199  
This transition will be supported by an “almost ubiquitous” societal push 
towards a sustainable future.200 The global energy transition is information that 
directors cannot afford to ignore while maintaining their managerial decisions and 
capital investment choices safely within the realm of compliance with fiduciary 
duties. Institutional investors are well-resourced and experienced litigants,201 and 
corporate lawsuits could become increasingly popular if directors do not take the 
risks of climate change to their businesses more seriously and do not consider energy 
transitions as part of their strategic business plans. Research that demonstrates the 
financial benefits of the global energy transition specifically for carbon-major 
corporations takes the issue beyond zero-sum environmentalism,202 to a legitimate 
business decision. Therefore, the risks of climate change combined with the business 
case for transition may lead to cleaner energy choices by directors. 
Despite the opportunities for transition available to carbon-major corporations, 
they have largely failed to seize these opportunities. The response has been uneven, 
with Shell recently announcing short-term caps on emissions as a result of investor 
pressure,203 but with most U.S.-based carbon-majors, such as ExxonMobil, doubling 
down on investments in fossil fuels, and ignoring the risks of climate change to their 
businesses and to society.204 This renewed investment in fossil fuels is based on the 
perception that efforts to reduce emissions undermine short-term commercial 
opportunities to monetize existing fossil fuel reserves.205 However, the failure of 
climate policy is likely to broaden risks across the global economy and increase risks 
to assets of carbon-majors.206 These short-term decisions leave carbon-major 
directors even more exposed to continued climate litigation.  
  
                                                   
199 Id. at 1.  
200 Id. at 2. 
201 Ganguly et al., supra note 21, at 21. 
202 See generally Shalanda Baker et al., Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, 47 ENV. 
L. REP. 4 (2017). 
203 Shell Agrees to Set Short-Term Caps on Carbon Emissions, FIN. POST (Dec. 3, 2018, 
3:06 PM), https://business.financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/shell-agrees-to-set-short-
term-caps-on-carbon-emissions [https://perma.cc/X7WK-NARA]. 
204 Crude Awakening, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2019), https://gbr.businessreview.glo 
bal/articles/view/5c6f7846c5be1300076c9094 [https://perma.cc/VYS6-MWG9]. 
205 Krane, supra note 49, at 1. 
206 Id. at 3. 
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C.  Corporate Law-Based Climate Litigation 
 
Several suits and investigations have been launched in the United States that 
involve corporate and securities law, including securities disclosure claims,207 as 
well as investigations by the New York and Massachusetts Attorneys General.208 
                                                   
207 While this article focuses on directors’ fiduciary duties, the fiduciary duties of 
pension fund managers has also been litigated and recently dismissed by a Texas court. In 
Fentress v. ExxonMobil Corp, a class action suit was brought by employees of the Exxon 
Savings Plan on the basis that senior corporate officers of the company, who were fiduciaries 
of the employee stock pension plan, knew or should have known that the stock was 
artificially inflated due to the risks of climate change. 304 F. Supp. 3d 569, 572 (S.D. Tex. 
2018). The plaintiffs claimed that the pension managers purchased $800 million worth of 
Exxon stocks despite the climate change risks, and the company should have written down 
its assets as stranded, claiming this was a breach of the duty of prudence, which required 
fiduciaries to manage the assets with care, skill, prudence and diligence pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1104(a)(1)(B). Fentress, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 573–74. A motion to dismiss by Exxon on 
March 30, 2018 was granted by the Texas court on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to show 
the risks of climate change had not already been included in the stock price. Id. at 580, 587. 
Relying on the efficient market hypothesis, the judge decided that the markets could take 
into account public information on climate change, and the plaintiffs had not plausibly linked 
the realities of climate change to the future health of an oil and gas company. Id. at 576–79. 
The issue of fiduciary duties for pension fund managers became a relevant one in the case, 
with the plaintiffs having to prove that the duty of prudence had been violated on the basis 
of non-public information. Id. at 580–81. In order to prove a breach of fiduciary duty, the 
plaintiffs would have to prove that an alternative action was available that was so clearly 
beneficial that a prudent fiduciary could not conclude it would be more likely to harm the 
fund than help it. Id. The plaintiffs put forward three alternative actions: corrective 
disclosures regarding Exxon’s reserves, halting new purchase orders of Exxon stock, and 
investing in low-cost hedging stock. Id. at 574. These were all dismissed as inappropriate by 
the judge on the basis that corrective disclosures and freezing stock trading would ultimately 
lower the price of the stock and could do more harm than good. Id. at 580–87. While 
unsuccessful here, more suits regarding lack of disclosure by private plaintiffs in the context 
of fiduciary duties are likely to continue where stock prices drop.  
208 In November 2015, the New York Attorney General served Exxon with a subpoena 
pursuant to N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 63(12) (Consol. 2019), N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2302(a) 
(Consol. 2019), and the Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2019)). Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Schneiderman, 316 F. Supp. 3d 679, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Together, these 
laws prohibit fraudulent practices in connection with securities sold in New York. See id. 
New York also subpoenaed PricewaterhouseCoopers in August 2016 in connection with the 
Exxon Mobil investigation. Decision & Order at 1, People v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 
No. 451962/16 (N.Y.S. Oct. 26, 2016), Doc. 41. New York’s investigation is designed to 
discover whether Exxon’s historical securities filings were misleading because they failed to 
disclose Exxon’s internal projections regarding the potential costs of both climate change 
and climate change regulation to the company. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion 
to Compel Compliance with Investigative Subpoena at 3–6, People v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 451962/2016 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2016), Doc. 38. 
In April 2016, the Massachusetts Attorney General served Exxon with a Civil Investigative 
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This section will focus on a new case that turned on fiduciary duties in the context 
of securities disclosures and corporate statements about climate risks. In 2017, a suit 
was launched regarding misleading Exxon reserves in Ramirez v. ExxonMobil.209 
The plaintiffs in Ramirez were successful at the pleadings stage, and the suit is 
continuing. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, in August 
2018, held that the plaintiffs, the Greater Pennsylvania Carpenters Pension Fund, 
successfully pleaded alleged material misrepresentations or omissions constituting 
securities fraud by ExxonMobil and a breach of the duty of loyalty by a number of 
its corporate directors and officers, regarding losses attributed to publicly traded 
stock acquired between 2014 and 2017.210 These losses were attributed by the 
plaintiffs to the failure by the directors and financial officers of ExxonMobil to 
recognize and inform investors of the business risks of climate change, and the value 
impairment of unconventional fossil fuel operations in the Canadian tar sands, the 
Rocky Mountain Dry Gas Operation, and Kearl Operations.211 The directors’ actions 
led, in 2016, to the company disclosing that 20% of its once proved reserves were 
no longer economically feasible, and therefore fell outside of the SEC definition of 
proved reserves, leading to a $2 billion impairment announcement in 2017.212  
                                                   
Demand pursuing fraudulent claims similar to those pursued by the New York Attorney 
General. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney General, 94 N.E. 786, 790 (Mass. 2018). The 
Massachusetts Attorney General requested from Exxon documents regarding whether the 
potential for stranded assets should have been disclosed. See Brief of Appellee Office of the 
Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 14–15, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Attorney General, 94 N.E. 786 (Mass. 2018) (No. SJC-12376). In response, Exxon sued the 
Attorneys General of New York and Massachusetts for abuse of process, civil conspiracy 
and violations of Exxon’s constitutional rights to free speech. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Schneiderman, 316 F. Supp. 3d 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Exxon claimed the investigations 
were designed to “silence and intimidate one side of the public policy debate on how to 
address climate change.” Id. at 688. A decision in March 2018 in the United States district 
court in New York provided a scathing order dismissing the motions by Exxon as a “wild 
stretch of logic.” Id. at 689. In spite of Exxon’s judicial protests, it appears that these 
investigations might bear fruit, as the Attorney General of New York recently settled with 
Peabody Energy, requiring a restatement of its financial disclosures. Press Release, New 
York Attorney General, A.G. Schneiderman Secures Unprecedented Agreement with 
Peabody Energy to End Misleading Statements and Disclose Risks Arising from Climate 
Change (Nov. 9, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-secures-
unprecedented-agreement-peabody-energy-end-misleading [https://perma.cc/PFN9-SRKL]. 
In October 2018, the New York Attorney General filed a lawsuit against Exxon for 
defrauding investors over the financial risks of climate change due to changing climate 
change regulation. Summons & Complaint at 1, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp, No. 
452044/2018 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 24, 2018), Doc. 1. However, in December 2019, the court 
dismissed New York’s Martin Act claim against Exxon. See Schwartz, supra note 100. 
209 Ramirez v. ExxonMobil, 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 840 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
210 Id. at 839–40. 
211 Id. 
212 ExxonMobil Earns $7.8 Billion in 2016; $1.7 Billion During Fourth Quarter, 
EXXONMOBIL, https://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~/media/global/files/earnings/2016/news_rele 
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The Ramirez plaintiffs alleged securities fraud under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and Rule 10b-5.213 The plaintiffs were 
successful at pleading material misstatement, including by omission, a breach of the 
duty of loyalty by the company and its officers in understating the proxy cost of 
carbon used, and for misstatements made in Form 10-K, and in its Corporate 
Outlook.214 Their pleading was successful enough to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, 
based on assertions that as shareholders they were misled by statements made by 
directors and officers in the company’s policy documents.215 These statements were 
misleading in that they stated that the company was properly considering the 
potential for changing climate regulations as well as carbon asset risks and climate 
risks to its business.216  
Ramirez focuses specifically on directors’ duties and duties to disclose relevant 
information on climate change and climate risk to shareholders in the securities 
context. The case is evidence of the growing use and relevance of corporate and 
securities law, and more specifically, fiduciary duties in the context of climate 
change litigation.217  
 
D.  Fiduciary Duties in the Context of Climate Risk 
 
In the absence of takeover circumstances, directors have obligations to manage 
the business in the best interests of the corporation and have the flexibility to take a 
long-term management approach.218 Fiduciary duties are made up of two primary 
                                                   
ase_earnings_4q16.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV2W-2DWH].  
213 Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 839. 
214 Id. at 847. 
215 Id. at 859. 
216 Id. 
217 For example, see new shareholder derivative actions in Montini v. Woods and 
Colditz v. Woods. See Complaint at 120, Montini v. Woods, No. 3.19-cv-01068-K (N.D. Tex. 
May 2, 2019), Doc. 1; Complaint for Petitioner at 121, Colditz v. Woods, No. 3.19-cv-01067 
(N.D. Tex. May 2, 2019), Doc. 1. 
218 See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 876 (Del. Ch. 1986). The Revlon 
doctrine applies in takeover circumstances in Delaware and holds that directors in takeover 
circumstances can deviate from the business judgment rule and focus on the short-term 
interests of stockholders instead of the long-term interest of the corporation. See Derek J. 
Famulari, The Revlon Doctrine – the Fiduciary Duties of Directors when Targets of 
Corporate Takeovers and Mergers, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/administrative/young_lawyers/publications/101/fiduciary_duties_of_directors_co
porate_takeover.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GMU-LYG6] (last visited Sept. 29, 
2019) (discussing Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986)); Joshua Fershee, Is the Revlon Doctrine Creeping into the Business Judgement Rule? 
(No), BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (Sept. 17, 2010), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/busin 
ess_law/2010/09/is-the-revlon-duty-creeping-into-the-business-judgment-rule-no.html 
[https://perma.cc/VX6F-VB2N]; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 783 (2012) (highlighting that given the perpetual existence of 
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duties: those of care and loyalty.219 The duty of care requires that directors make 
decisions in a carefully considered manner.220 Courts want to know that directors 
have considered all material information reasonably available to them, and this now 
includes climate risks and opportunities based on the best scientifically available 
information and best industry practice.221 The duty of care could be applicable where 
directors fail to take into account material information regarding the risks climate 
change poses to their businesses, with courts focusing on the process of the directors’ 
decision-making, and whether the decisions were made in good faith.222 
The duty of loyalty, as interpreted by Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. 
Ritter,223 provides that directors have a responsibility to ensure that appropriate 
information and reporting systems are established by management to ensure 
compliance with key regulatory regimes.224 The duty of loyalty can be violated if 
directors demonstrate a conscious disregard for their responsibilities.225 Such 
                                                   
corporations, “immortal investing” should be the guiding principle for corporate directors, 
which would have public benefits including acting as stewards for natural resources). 
219 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 2006) (subsuming the duty of good 
faith under the duty of loyalty leaving only the duties of care and loyalty as stand-alone, 
independent duties); see also Stephen Bainbridge, Good Faith in Delaware After Stone v. 
Ritter, STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE’S J. L., RELIGION, POL., & CULTURE (Jan. 3, 2007), 
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2007/01/good-faith-in-dela 
ware-after-stone-v-ritter.html [https://perma.cc/BF48-M2SU]. 
220 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 125 (2d ed. 2009). 
221 See Barker, supra note 31, at 200–02. 
222 See Wallace, supra note 179, at 764. 
223 Stone, 911 A.2d at 371. The decision is not without its critics, with Bainbridge 
stating that this intentional failure to act constituting a breach of the duty of loyalty guts the 
business judgment rule. See Stephen Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter: Directors Caremark 
Oversight Duties, STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE’S J. L., RELIGION, POL., & CULTURE (Jan. 3, 2007), 
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2007/01/stone-v-ritter-
directors-caremark-oversight-duties.html [https://perma.cc/NY4V-2NVF] [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter]. 
224 Stone, 911 A.2d at 368–71 (applying In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative 
Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)). The “Caremark’ duties” are often referred to as 
the fiduciary duty of oversight. See Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 223 (noting that 
Stone v. Ritter reinterprets the Caremark duties of oversight as duties of good faith and 
loyalty and not those of care). 
225 See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. The Caremark case illustrated that, in limited 
circumstances, high profile oversight failures could be regarded as not just gross negligence 
by directors but instead as acts of disloyalty for sustainable or systemic failure to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists, and illustrates the increasing importance 
of board function under Delaware law, as well as the need for the Board to be fully informed. 
Wallace, supra note 179, at 761 (noting, however, that the subsequent Citigroup derivative 
action suit, In Re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A 2d 106 (Del. Ch. 
2009), casts doubt on the Caremark approach). Marc Moore highlights how difficult this 
threshold is to reach in Delaware Courts in the area of systemic risk oversight, citing the 
Citigroup shareholder derivative litigation. See Marc T. Moore, Redressing Risk Oversight 
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disregard will demonstrate that they have not discharged their fiduciary obligations 
in good faith.226 Similarly, according to the Delaware Supreme Court in In Re Walt 
Disney Company Derivative Litigation (the Disney case),227 acts of bad faith include 
where a director intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the 
best interests of the corporation, where she acts with the intention to violate 
applicable law or intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, 
demonstrating a conscious disregard for her duties.228 Combined, these duties of care 
and loyalty focus the courts’ attention on whether the director was fully informed, 
disinterested, and independent in her decision making. 
The business judgment rule is a largely process-based rule as defined in 
Delaware, and used by courts to assess directors’ decisions and whether those 
decisions complied with their directors’ duties.229 Under this rule, the court is not 
concerned with the content of the decision made by a director, but instead with the 
process by which the decision was made.230 Absent illegality, fraud or self-dealing, 
courts under the business judgment rule presume that directors have employed their 
own appropriate business judgment to the issue at hand.231 The court will assess “the 
good faith or rationality of the process employed.”232 However, as a result of this 
emphasis on process, even if the outcome is ill-advised, courts are unlikely to 
                                                   
Failure in UK and US Listed Companies: Lessons from the RBS and Citigroup Litigation, 
18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 733, 743–46 (2017) (noting that security disclosure violations 
may be a more successful route to addressing systemic risk failures by directors than 
directors’ duties). Hill notes that while liability for breach of the Caremark duties would face 
significant obstacles, the soft law ‘penumbra’ of the case has and will encourage compliance 
action by directors. See generally Claire Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 681 
(2018) (noting that while liability for breach of the Caremark duties would face significant 
obstacles, the soft law ‘penumbra’ of the case has and will encourage compliance action by 
directors). 
226 See In Re Caremark Intl. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
227 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
228 Id. at 67. Wallace notes that Stone v. Ritter requires that directors must have been 
conscious of the fact they were not monitoring and requires ‘persistent indolence’ on their 
party in order for a claim of oversight failure to be successful, although he notes the duty of 
oversight is distinguishable from the duty of care to take decisions on strategic climate action. 
Wallace, supra note 179, at 761. 
229 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Stone, 911 A.2d at 370; In 
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 970–71; Hanson Tr. PLC v. ML SCM 
Acquisition, Inc., 781 F. 2d 264, 274–76 (2d Cir. 1986); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 
262–64 (Del. 2000). 
230 See Stone, 911 A.2d at 367. 
231 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255. 
232 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 967. Elhauge argues that the 
business judgment rule was established as courts could not figure out what maximizes 
profits, and so rely on directors to do so. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in 
the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 743 (2005). 
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intervene, provided the director’s decision is the product of good faith and a rational 
process.233 Fershee notes that the increasing focus on profitmaking by directors may 
narrow directors’ decision-making power.234 He notes that this increasing turn in 
Delaware towards profitability may convert the business judgment rule away from 
an abstention rule to a more intrusive standard assumed by courts, marking a 
significant departure from its historical interpretations.235  
There is a presumption that, in order to benefit from the business judgment rule, 
directors must have informed themselves of all material information and acted with 
care on the basis of that information.236 Directors should also act in accordance with 
their duties of loyalty and care.  
The case of Pfeffer v. Redstone237 established that making a materially false or 
misleading statement to shareholders can violate state law fiduciary duties.238 In the 
securities law context, according to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Omnicare, 
Inc. v. Laborers District Council Constr. Ind. Pens. Fund,239 directors breach their 
duty of loyalty if their statements to shareholders are not honest, and this includes 
where the directors’ opinion is not honestly held.240 If facts such as the risks of 
climate change to the business are either held by the company or are within the 
knowledge of directors, and would undermine any opinion given by directors to 
shareholders, this could lead to personal liability for breach of the duty of loyalty.241  
                                                   
233 See Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 223. 
234 Joshua P. Fershee, The End of Responsible Growth and Governance?: The Risks 
Posed by Social Enterprise Enabling Statutes and the Demise of Director Primacy, 19 TENN. 
J. BUS. L. 361, 363 (2018) (pointing out there is no reason for a community service mission 
to itself to not serve the purpose of promoting the value of the corporation for the benefit of 
its shareholders). 
235 Id. 
236 See Robert T. Miller, Wrongful Omissions by Corporate Directors: Stone v. Ritter 
and Adapting the Process Model of the Delaware Business Judgement Rule, 10 U. PA. J. 
BUS. & EMP. L. 911, 912–13 (2008) (noting that violation of directors’ duties for omission is 
one of the most difficult to prove, depending on whether a director failed to consider acting 
at all, or considered an action and then decided not to act). 
237 965 A.2d 676 (Del. 2009). 
238 Id. at 684. 
239 Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Industry Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 
1318, 1327 (2015). 
240 See id. Although Omnicare expressly examined the disclosure requirements of 
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, these statutory disclosure requirements and the 
Omnicare decision implicate state law fiduciary duties. See Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. 
Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 
66 DUKE L. J. 763, 773, 768–88 (2016). 
241 See generally David Estrin & Cynthia A. Williams, Hearing Before the Philippines 
Human Rights Commission, New York (Sept. 28, 2018) (on file with author). Cynthia A. 
Williams and David Estrin submitted a summary of recommended measures to the 
Philippines Commission on Human Rights Inquiry at the hearing in New York on September 
28, 2018 outlining a number of legal obligations of officers and directors of carbon major 
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At the pleadings stage, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
in Ramirez paid significant attention to the Omnicare decision in the context of 
material misstatements made by officers of ExxonMobil.242 While Exxon attempted 
to rely on the Omnicare decision by characterizing its asset valuations and 
impairment statements as opinions only, the court was clear that if underlying facts 
are not provided to shareholders, and contradict statements made, that can render 
directors’ statements misleading by omission.243 The Ramirez court noted that, 
according to the Omnicare standard, even if the speaker genuinely holds opinions 
expressed, it could still constitute a material misstatement by omission if the speaker 
omits material facts about the speaker’s inquiry into or knowledge concerning a 
statement of opinion if those omitted facts conflict with what a reasonable investor 
would take from the statements.244 Based on a Fifth Circuit decision, which held that 
alleged accounting violations are sufficient to plead material misstatements, the 
Ramirez court stated that ExxonMobil’s officers’ alleged GAAP violations and 
opinions regarding the Rocky Mountain Dry Gas Operation not being impaired 
necessarily omitted particular facts which made their opinions materially 
misleading.245 The officers’ positions on the board and their familiarity with the 
proxy cost for carbon used by the company exposed them to a potential breach of 
their directors’ duties.246 
Increased litigation and escalating climate risks, therefore, have legal 
implications for directors’ and officers’ liability. Impact litigation against carbon-
major corporations raises the risk metrics of climate change for their businesses, and 
also raises the profile of climate change for directors and investors. Directors will 
breach their duties of care and loyalty if they fail to understand the risks of climate 
change to their business and, where these risks are considerable, have failed to 
convey these risks to shareholders. Barker and Winter note that the law “does not 
tolerate decisions based on uninformed assumptions, or that arise by default from a 
failure to turn the directional mind to a relevant issue.”247 Directors will also be liable 
if they utterly failed to implement a reporting and information system which is 
                                                   
enterprises and their investors, as well as recommended voluntary actions by these entities, 
including committing to corporate policies and actions to achieve emission reductions and 
decarbonisation of their primary energy supplies, develop specific business plans and 
investment allocation to ensure peaking of carbon emissions by 2020 using minimum 
disclosure expectations set out in a 2018 report of the Transition Pathway Initiative, and to 
have the plans peer-reviewed. They recommend these actions be backstopped by government 
requirements. Id.  
242 Ramirez v. ExxonMobil, 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 839 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
243 Id. at 848.  
244 Id. at 847–48.  
245 Id. at 848 (citing Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 257–58 (5th Cir. 
2006)). 
246 Id. at 851–54. 
247 Sarah Barker & Kurt Winter, Changing Balance of Evidence, ESG MAGAZINE, 
Winter 2016, at 46.  
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commensurate with corresponding risks to the business and legal obligations, or, if 
having implemented such a system, they consciously failed to monitor or oversee its 
operations, thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems 
requiring their attention.248 Both limbs of the test require a showing that directors 
knew they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations in order for liability to be 
imposed.249 Barker notes that, in relation to stranded assets, directors who 
consciously disregard or are willfully blind to stranded asset risks through, for 
example, ‘default denialism’ consistent with industry-based or partisan political 
affiliations, may be subject to a claim that they failed to discharge their duty to 
prioritize the best interests of the company.250 A changing balance of evidence from 
science suggests that a shift is occurring from climate change being seen merely as 
an ethical concern, to a significant financial concern for carbon-major corporations 
and their investors, meaning directors are legally obligated to consider climate 
risks.251 Directors would have direct and actual notice of climate risk as a result of 
regulatory investigations or litigation brought against their own company, and 
potentially by suits brought against other fossil fuel corporations.252 While Ramirez 
has just passed the pleadings stage, the case provides an important example of how 
existing fiduciary duties could require directors of public companies with securities 
duties to disclose information to shareholders about climate change and climate risk.  
The rise of this second wave of litigation, therefore, increases the materiality of 
the risks of climate change to businesses and investors in those businesses and 
consequentially affects corporate governance. According to the Omnicare decision, 
directors will be at risk of breaching the duty of loyalty if they do not act 
appropriately with their shareholders, meaning they should inform their shareholders 
of the transition risks of climate change.253 Transition risks include increased 
regulation on climate change, which may affect the bottom lines of these 
businesses.254 Increased disclosure by directors to investors of both the material 
financial risks of climate change as well as transition risks are also being demanded 
by investors independent of litigation through shareholder proposals submitted at 
                                                   
248 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). Stone involved the lack of 
implementation of a risk-based system in relation to anti-money laundering legal obligations 
and knowledge by the directors that they were not complying with their fiduciary duties is a 
requirement. This obligation will be more relevant where directors have legal obligations 
around emissions. See Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 223. 
249 Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 223. 
250 Barker, supra note 31, at 211. 
251 Barker & Winter, supra note 247, at 46. 
252 Barker, supra note 31, at 212–13. 
253 See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Industry Pension Fund, 135 S. 
Ct. 1318, 1327 (2015); see also supra discussion in note 240. 
254 See supra Section III.A.  
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annual general meetings (AGMs).255 Directors are unlikely to be able to ward off 
shareholder proposals, and the issue is likely to remain an agenda item at AGMs. 
In April and May 2015, at the AGMs of both BP and Royal Dutch Shell, 
shareholder resolutions supported by a majority of shareholders as well as by 
management were passed.256 The shareholder resolutions requested enhanced 
reporting by these corporations on their exposure to climate change, including 
portfolio resistance to the International Energy Agency’s 2030 energy scenarios.257 
They also requested further information on operational environmental management 
and public policy positions on climate change.258 The resolutions were submitted 
specifically in light of the Paris Agreement negotiations.259 The reasoning behind 
the shareholder resolution, as shared by “Aiming for A,” was to understand how 
these corporations were preparing for the low-carbon transition, reveal systemic 
risks that may impact investors, and engage in more collective fiduciary duties and 
enhance shareholder voice on climate change.260  
In 2015 and 2016, similar resolutions requesting more action on climate 
change, including increased disclosure and the long-term portfolio impacts of 
climate change regulations and policies, were put forward at the AGMs of 
ExxonMobil and Chevron.261 The Exxon resolution was not accepted by the majority 
of shareholders.262 Shareholders did, however, pass a resolution that could enable 
them to appoint board members with expertise in climate change.263 In 2017, 
shareholders of Occidental Petroleum approved a shareholder proposal requiring 
that the company disclose the business impacts of climate change.264 This vote marks 
                                                   
255 See, e.g., AIMING FOR A COALITION, SPECIAL RESOLUTION – STRATEGIC RESILIENCE 
FOR 2035 AND BEYOND (2015), https://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/resources_attachmen 
ts/royaldutchshell2015resolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZQ2-36UE]. 
256 Megan Darby, BP Adopts Climate Risk Proposal After Shareholder Vote, CLIMATE 
CHANGE NEWS (Apr. 16, 2015, 3:02 PM), https://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/04/16/ 
bp-adopts-climate-risk-proposal-after-shareholder-vote/ [https://perma.cc/EV8F-W46G].  




261 Karen Savage, Climate Proposals Fail at Exxon, Chevron Shareholder Meetings, 
CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (May 29, 2019), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2019/05/ 
29/climate-proposals-exxon-chevron/ [https://perma.cc/RA3U-RD55].  
262 Id. 
263 Rupert Neate, ExxonMobil CEO: Ending Oil Production ‘Not Acceptable for 
Humanity,’ GUARDIAN (May 25, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/ 
2016/may/25/exxonmobil-ceo-oil-climate-change-oil-production [https://perma.cc/2M99-
SNGP].  
264 Emily Chasan, Occidental Holders Override Board in Approving Climate Proposal, 
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the first time that a climate-related shareholder resolution was passed over the 
objections of the board.265  
A number of carbon-major corporations, including Exxon, in relation to the 
2016 shareholder resolutions, applied to the SEC under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) requesting 
permission to exclude these proposals from proxy materials to be circulated to 
shareholders on the basis that they were vague or indefinite.266 The SEC, in all cases, 
disagreed, meaning that these corporations had to include the shareholder proposals 
in proxy materials, allowing all shareholders to vote on them.267 Renssen notes that 
climate litigation has been given a “new lease on life” partly due to these shareholder 
actions targeting carbon-majors.268 
                                                   
265 It is important to note that shareholder proposals on their own are not binding on the 
corporation. In November 2019, the SEC proposed amendments to, among other things, 
increase the thresholds of shareholder eligibility to submit proposals under Rule 14a-8(b). 
See generally SEC Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds under Exchange 
Act Rule 14a-8, 84 Fed. Reg. 66458 (proposed Dec. 4, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
Part 240) (The rule was proposed by the Commission on Nov. 5, 2019, but was not published 
in the Federal Register until Dec. 4, 2019. See id. at 66515).  
266 Exxon Mobil Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2019/adamseitchik040219-14a8. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/527Z-MQQC].  
267 However, the SEC allowed the company to reject a shareholder submission 
requesting ExxonMobil to set emissions targets consistent with the Paris Agreement. See 
Gary McWilliams, U.S. Regulator Rules Out Exxon Shareholder Vote on Climate 
Resolution, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2019, 2:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
exxon-mobil-climatechange/u-s-regulator-rules-out-exxon-shareholder-vote-on-climate-
resolution-idUSKCN1RE2E5 [https://perma.cc/Y5Z6-8DQV]. 
268 Renssen, supra note 60, at 655. In 2010, the SEC issued guidance to investors 
regarding disclosures obligations in the context of climate change. Commission Guidance 
Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6296 (Feb. 8, 2010) 
(interpreting 17 C.F.R. pts 211, 231, 241). The SEC guidance lists several disclosure 
obligations which may be relevant, including Securities Act Rule 408 and the Exchange Act 
Rule 12b-20, which requires registrants to disclose further “material” information as may be 
necessary to ensure that statements are not misleading. Commission Guidance Regarding 
Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6293–94. In Basic v. Levinson, the 
U.S. Supreme Court deemed a consideration to be material “if there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” 485 U.S. 
224, 231 (1988). While there has been very little action by the SEC in relation to its 2010 
guidance, the legal requirement to disclose under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77d-1(a)(4), (5) (2012), remains. The Act requires disclosure of material information which 
would ensure that the filing was not “misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.301(b) (2019). Further, 
the increasing number of extra-judicial resolutions submitted by shareholders against carbon 
major corporations requesting disclosure of the risks of climate change may exemplify that 
climate change itself is now considered material by shareholders. In addition, Item 103 of 
Regulation S-K requires a registrant to briefly describe any material pending legal 
proceedings to which it or its subsidiaries may be a party to. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2019). 
Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
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Fiduciary duties not only require directors to identify and assess climate risks 
but can also provide tools for directors to consider and address the risks of climate 
change. Heminway notes that corporate law in the social enterprise context remains, 
at least in some states, a very flexible legal tool.269 She states that corporate law 
provides sufficient flexibility to directors in for-profit companies to consider what 
is best for shareholders in the long term, and can incorporate social enterprise 
approaches that consider shareholder wealth maximization.270 
 
E.  Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Climate Risk 
 
The shareholder wealth maximization norm is often seen as a barrier to climate 
action, but in fact, the norm is primarily focused on the long-term profitability of the 
corporation. It is the most dominant norm undergirding U.S. corporate law and 
fiduciary duties in particular.271 While not reflected in statutory obligations, its 
                                                   
of Financial Conditions and Results of Operations (or MD&A) to enable investors to see the 
registrant entity from the perspective of management. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2019) (Item 303). 
This statement should identify known trends, events, demands and uncertainties that are 
reasonably likely to have a material effect on the financial condition or operating 
performance of the registrant. Id. § 229.303(a)(1). The SEC guidance notes that the time 
horizon is not specified for the MD&A analysis and will depend on the registrant’s particular 
circumstances. 75 Fed. Reg. at 6290, 6296. The risk factors assessed should include 
regulation, scientific and technological updates, as well as physical risks of climate change. 
See id.; see also Wallace, supra note 179, at 776 (noting that directors may determine that 
litigation risk does not reach the level of materiality that would require disclosure under Item 
103 of Regulation S-K, assuming the litigation may not succeed due to causation hurdles, 
but that the MD&A disclosures may be a more potent tool for climate change disclosures, 
and that combined with political, economic and “advocacy-driven public consciousness,” 
federal securities law could be the “main impetus for corporate action”). 
269 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up on Traditional For-Profit 
Corporations for Sustainable Social Enterprise, 86 UMKC L. REV. 779, 786 (2018). 
270 Id. 
271 There are a variety of theoretical normative approaches to the objective of the 
corporation. Shareholder primacy was originally based on shareholders as owners of the 
company or, alternatively according to agency theorists, that shareholders own residual 
claims over corporate assets. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 45, at 1436. The ownership 
theory has been supplanted by the nexus of contracts or contractarian theories, which evolved 
from Coase’s transactional costs theories, and generally characterise the corporation as a 
nexus or series of default contracts, and particularly as a species of private law. Id. at 1430. 
For a description of the varieties of theoretical approaches in the contractarian vein, see 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 45, at 606. For a critique of this approach to the 
corporation, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1527 (1989). Contractarian theories are 
not uncontested. Lipton and Rosenblum contest the private characterization of corporations, 
pointing to their ties to the state and public welfare histories. In particular, they put forward 
an alternative model of the corporation as an entity, having its own independent interests in 
long-term business success. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of 
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normative power is still considerable, and it has been deemed a “fundamental norm” 
guiding corporate decision making, particularly in Delaware. Fershee has noted that 
recent Delaware cases and judicial writings have elevated this norm to a more 
“singular and narrow obligation for for-profit entities.”272 Norms are powerful tools 
in corporate law. Corporate actors, such as directors, are often influenced by 
corporate culture and norm-based standards.273 So while often criticized, it is 
important to determine where synergies or complementarities between shareholder 
wealth maximization and climate risks to corporations can be found.  
Contractarian theory characterizes the corporation as a nexus or series of 
private, default contracts or reciprocal arrangements between constituents who have 
a stake in its operations and profitability.274 As these contracts are necessarily 
incomplete, fiduciary duties stand as “gap fillers,” available to courts where cracks 
or holes in these contracts between shareholders and corporate officers and directors 
appear.275 The hypothetical bargain analysis asks what contractual terms rational 
parties would have agreed to had they addressed these gaps ex ante, and the 
prevailing theoretical view is that they would have agreed to maximize shareholder 
value.276 The purpose of fiduciary duties and the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm that guides their application, according to contractarians, is to focus the loyalty 
                                                   
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 
189, 202–03 (1991). Blair and Stout also put forward the team production theory, where 
directors focus instead on key contributors, which provide valuable inputs to the firm. See 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 249–55 (1999). 
272 Fershee, supra note 234, at 362 (attributing this increased focus partly on the rise of 
social enterprise corporate forms, but also to the general decline of director primacy towards 
a more intrusive interpretation of the business judgment rule by the courts in Delaware). 
273 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, Introduction, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608 (2001). 
274 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, 
and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822–23 (1999). There is some debate 
whether the corporation in this approach is itself the nexus of contracts or is separate and 
apart from the nexus of contracts. For example, Bainbridge argues that the corporation is a 
nexus of contracts. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 45, at 553. Hessen also argues 
that the corporation is not an entity, but instead a group of contracting individuals. See Robert 
Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property Model, 30 
HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1336 (1979). 
275 Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 45, at 586; see also Jonathan R. Macey, 
An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive 
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 41 (1991). 
276 Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional 
Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 217 (2000). There are clear critiques 
of this approach. See, e.g., LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW 
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 
(2012). 
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of directors towards shareholders.277 Shareholders are reified and elevated in this 
characterization of the corporation through a hypothetical bargain analysis. 
Shareholder wealth maximization appears as the majoritarian default rule or the 
governing principle that the majority of participants in this hypothetical bargain 
would choose.278 
According to many contractarians, the role of shareholder wealth maximization 
is to seek long-term shareholder value or gain.279 However, Jensen describes the 
ultimate goal of the corporation in terms of the firm and not shareholder value. He 
states that the value maximization norm means that corporate managers should make 
all decisions so as to increase the total long-run market value of the firm.280 Allen et 
al. describe one possible aim of corporate law as being to achieve the best results for 
stockholders, based on the property model of the corporation that generates value 
for the entity in the long term.281 Delaware law has embraced the property model of 
the corporation as an entity, which still incorporates shareholder wealth 
maximization, but in a form that emphasizes long-term wealth maximization by 
reinforcing some powers of corporate directors.282 
Hansmann and Kraakman describe the primary aim of corporate law as striving 
to increase long-term shareholder value.283 However, the definition of shareholder 
value is often unclear.284 Shareholders represent a shifting class of investors, some 
with long term and others with short term profit profiles. It is difficult for managers 
to determine the time and risk preferences of existing and future shareholders.285 As 
                                                   
277 Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 45, at 1441. 
278 Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 45, at 573. 
279 Id. at 583. 
280 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate 
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282 Id. at 1079; see also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the 
Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 272–75 (1992) (noting that, historically, 
theories of wealth maximization have ‘papered over’ the conflict over the conceptual 
approaches of the corporation by invoking what he calls a murky distinction between long-
term profit maximization and short-term profit maximization).  
283 Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, supra note 45, at 
439–41. 
284 See Hemingway, supra note 167, at 970–71 n.90 (noting that value can often be a 
broader term than wealth maximization, with the latter often focusing solely on profit 
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285 Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 
UCLA L. REV. 277, 287 (1990) (noting that directors must satisfy both widows and orphans 
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CORP. L. 27, 37 (1996) (explaining that shareholders diverge in their interests in several ways 
including long-term versus short term, diversified versus non-diversified, and individual 
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a result, directors may seek to maximize share price, but markets are not always 
efficient in terms of absorbing and assessing information.286 As Keay notes, the 
strong version of the efficient market hypothesis states that the share price will 
automatically take into account all public and private information at any given time 
about the corporation, and the semi-strong version takes into account all public 
information.287 Therefore, while descriptions of shareholder wealth maximization 
often incorporate a long-term view, its application does not always (or even 
typically) clearly distinguish between shareholder value and share price, or provide 
guidance to directors on whether their focus should be on share value or overall firm 
value.288  
Reliance solely on share price depends on the efficient market hypothesis – that 
markets accurately, efficiently, and timely absorb and assess all relevant information 
about the corporations.289 Stout describes this as the “Achilles heel” of the 
hypothesis because it is not clear how information flows into share price 
valuation.290 Market prices may not closely reflect actual expected risks and returns. 
Therefore, the use of share price alone as a decisional tool may encourage 
mismanagement of assets by directors in favor of short-term returns.291 Markets are 
not very good at assessing and taking into account long-term systemic risk.292 
Information that is complex or difficult to acquire may take a long time to be 
                                                   
versus institutional); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder 
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term investors and their potential alignment with stakeholders); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
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286 See Hu, supra note 285, at 357–58. 
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Law, 39 COMM. L. WORLD REV. 358, 369–70 (2010); Id. at 375 (questioning in the social 
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288 Hu, supra note 285, at 295–300. 
289 Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New 
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291 Id. at 657. 
292 The financial crisis of 2008 illustrates these failings. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, 
On the Receipt of the Ronald H. Coase Medal: Uncertainty, the Economic Crisis, and the 
Future of Law and Economics, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 265, 278 (2010); U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development, Corporate Governance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: 
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absorbed into the share price and may never be fully absorbed.293 This is particularly 
the case in the context of climate change and climate risk – businesses are generally 
not accurately accounting for and incorporating the significant, short-, medium-, or 
long-term risks of climate change to their business.294 
Despite the significant levels of risk facing corporations due to climate change, 
short-termism still persists with the reliance on efficient capital market theories that 
blur or dismiss the distinction between short-term and long-term interests.295 The 
impacts of climate change are already affecting companies in terms of increased 
operational costs, disrupted production, plant shutdowns, worker absences due to 
extreme events, as well as compromised assets.296 Because the impacts of climate 
change are only predicted to worsen in the coming decades, companies must shift 
from an incrementalist adaptation approach to transformational and long-term 
approaches to decision-making and disclosures on climate risk and climate 
change.297 This requires long-term thinking, and the ability to manage large time 
scales and complex information on climate change and to adapt these into smaller 
pieces of information that can be absorbed into industry sectors and individual 
corporate strategies. Directors will need guidance and expertise to do this, and they 
must adopt long-term thinking.298 
                                                   
293 Stout, supra note 289, at 656. 
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While the shareholder wealth maximization norm is commonly interpreted as 
allowing directors to take a long-term view, systemic market forces that tend towards 
short-termism still have a powerful grip over the norm’s application. Therefore, 
fiscal incentives, along with broader and deeper regulatory changes on corporate 
emissions, are required for swift and effective transitions away from fossil fuels. 
Despite these disincentives, fiduciary duties as currently interpreted are sufficiently 
flexible to allow directors to take into account the risks of climate change to their 
businesses and take a longer-term perspective on value creation that incorporates the 
risks and opportunities of energy transitions. In particular, fiduciary duties as guided 
by the shareholder wealth maximization norm at the very least require directors to 
be informed of and take into account the risks of climate change to their businesses. 
Barker notes that as climate risks have evolved to become an issue of financial 
import for many corporations, assessing climate risk is not only consistent with but 
is now a prerequisite to the maximization of wealth.299 In addition, directors’ views 
on maximization of wealth may be changing. In August 2019, the Business 
Roundtable (a group of CEOs of approximately 200 of the largest U.S. corporations) 
issued a statement on the purpose of the corporation, which differed significantly 
from all of their previous statements issued since 1997 which had all focused 
primarily on shareholders. In the 2019 statement, a commitment to all stakeholders 
is emphasized, as well as a focus on generating long-term value for shareholders.300 
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While increasing litigation on climate change has raised the profile of climate 
risks, and fiduciary duties provide sufficient flexibility to directors to assess and 
consider climate risk, several barriers still remain. One such barrier is the structure 
of corporate groups, as will be discussed in the next section. Shareholders of 
companies enjoy limited liability, meaning that shareholders, absent certain 
circumstances, are not liable for debts incurred by the corporation in which they hold 
shares.301 These shareholders may themselves be corporations, called parent 
corporations, and together they form a corporate group.302 Limited liability is one of 
the hallmarks of corporate law, and only when courts decide to pierce the corporate 
veil will limited liability not apply to parent companies.303 Climate litigation against 
subsidiary companies may encounter difficulties in attempting to fix liability on the 
parent companies due to the firmly entrenched system of segregating liability into 
individual corporate entities within a corporate group structure. As a result, climate 
policies decided by the parent company and applied to subsidiary companies may 
not attract liability at the parent level. 
 
F.  Corporate Group Structures – A Barrier to Climate Liability? 
 
One area which has received less attention in this recent spate of cases is the 
role of the corporate group structure in terms of liability. In many of these cases, the 
parent company has been the focus of liability. However, large corporations often 
segregate jurisdictional activity into separate legal entities within a corporate group 
structure to purposefully disaggregate liability away from the parent company, even 
if the profits are issued via dividends up to it.304 Firms facing higher litigation risk 
often tend to have more subsidiaries.305 The separate liability of corporate actors 
within group structures has long been established in law.306 But liability can be 
overcome by courts piercing the corporate veil, imposing liability on parent 
companies for debts of their subsidiaries. Common law jurisdictions such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom use similar tests for piercing the corporate 
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veil, including: the alter ego test; the test of whether there has been complete 
domination by a parent company of a subsidiary company; the test of whether the 
parent has abused the privilege of incorporation; and the single business enterprise 
doctrine.307 
A recent case in the United Kingdom illustrates how difficult piercing the veil 
can be in the carbon-major group structure. The case of HRH Emere Godwin Bebe 
Okpabi308 highlights the relevance of this doctrine in the context of climate change 
litigation. Here, the claimants were seeking damages as a result of serious and 
ongoing pollution from leaks of oil from a pipeline in the Niger Delta from the parent 
company of the Royal Dutch Shell group.309 The local subsidiary, Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (RDS), and its subsidiary, SPDC, were also 
respondents. The claimants claimed negligence under the common law of Nigeria, 
which is the same as the common law test in the United Kingdom, and brought a suit 
in the English courts, which was appealed to the Court of Appeal.310 The Court of 
Appeal considered the 3-part test of the duty of care as foreseeability, proximity, and 
reasonableness, and considered that a parent company could owe a duty of care to 
an employee of a subsidiary or a party directly affected by its operations in certain 
circumstances: where the parent has taken direct responsibility for devising a 
material health and safety policy and its adequacy is the subject of the claim, or the 
parent controls the operations which give rise to the claim.311  
However, issuing mandatory policies was not sufficient, in the majority’s 
opinion, to demonstrate the sufficient nexus of control by the parent over the 
operations of the subsidiary.312 The policies in question were at a high level, and 
none came close to establishing the sort of proximity necessary to establish a duty 
of care. There was, however, a strident dissent by LJ Sales, who noted that RDS did 
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put in place security, motivated by the negligent management of the pipeline by the 
subsidiary and the negative reputational damage this was causing the parent 
company.313 He argued that, because RDS directed what steps SPDC should take, 
and joint decisions had been taken, this activity was enough to establish a direct and 
substantial relationship and, therefore, a pattern of distribution of expertise and 
control, which was arguably capable of piercing the corporate veil and meeting the 
criteria in Chandler v. Cape.314 The Vice Chancellor was less sanguine, stating 
bluntly that the corporate structure itself is specifically designed, and therefore 
militates against, requisite proximity being met.315 However, the U.K. Supreme 
Court in 2019 accepted jurisdiction to hear the appeal of another case regarding a 
claim brought by 1,800 Zambian villagers against U.K.-based Vedanta and its 
Zambian subsidiary regarding waste discharges from a copper mine, specifically on 
the basis that group policies can, in fact, establish a sufficient nexus of control 
between parent and subsidiary.316  
These cases on liability by a parent in the group structure are relevant in the 
climate change context, as most policies on climate change and emissions reductions 
are produced at the parent level, and the issuing of mandatory guidance is clearly 
established by this case as not providing a sufficient relationship of proximity. While 
a U.K. case, the outcome in relation to mandatory policies is similar to a U.S. case 
on piercing the corporate veil.317 In Gardemal v. Westin Hotel,318 a widow attempted 
to sue the U.S. parent company of Westin Hotels regarding the death of her husband 
while they were staying at a Mexican subsidiary of the hotel chain. The plaintiff 
attempted to rely on a number of circumstances, including standard mandatory 
policies and practices shared within the group structure, as well as similar 
trademarks.319 These were specifically held to be insufficient in establishing the 
single business enterprise ground of piercing the corporate veil.320 
While many states in the United States use a totality of circumstances test, and 
therefore each case is decided on its facts, the use of standard climate policies within 
a corporate group on its own,321 and without significant control exercised by the 
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parent company, will likely not be sufficient to fix liability on the parent company. 
This means that litigation in jurisdictions where parent corporations are located may 
be cut short if litigation is only directed at the parent company and not the local 
subsidiary where the harm is being felt. Climate litigation against carbon-major 
corporations is therefore not likely to coalesce in the near future into a wave of 
successful suits against parent corporations and, therefore, the impacts of litigation 
may be muted if parent corporations are not subject to any awards of damages. 
 
IV.  WHICH WAY FORWARD FOR DIRECTORS? 
 
Climate risks for corporations are increasing dramatically. As discussed in the 
previous sections, litigation is likely to only continue against carbon-major 
corporations, and new scientific processes will continue to advance understanding 
of these companies’ contributions to climate impacts, thereby increasing the chances 
of success of litigation efforts. Climate litigation matters in an era of failing global 
governance, as it has the ability to connect different actors and governance scales.322 
Climate change has been called a “multi-scalar” problem323 due to the fact that its 
governance is found among multiple levels of actors at the local, regional, national 
and international levels. Interactions amongst these governance scales are often 
problematic, and so litigation can serve a unique governance function, as it “creates 
fluid pathways for interactions among regulation at subnational, national, and 
international levels.”324 The role of litigation in transnational law is particularly 
pertinent for multinational entities such as carbon-major corporations, which have 
subsidiaries and/or operations in disparate jurisdictions. Multinational corporations 
are sensitive to regulatory changes and progressive judicial decisions in various 
jurisdictions due to their global footprints.  
Climate change is posing tremendous risks to corporate assets globally.325 The 
impacts of climate change will put corporate assets at risk, including their 
infrastructure, consumer base, supply chains, and, therefore, business models. 
Directors sit in the crosshairs of these emerging impacts, information, and risks, and 
they must act. This section highlights the publicity risks of increased litigation, the 
links between litigation and directors’ decision-making, as well as some potential 
climate-based management strategies that could be adopted by directors in the face 
of mounting climate impacts and risks. 
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A.  Courtrooms as Key Battlegrounds 
 
Courtrooms have become key battlegrounds in the public debate over climate 
change.326 As Blumm and Wood note, courts offer a deliberative fact-finding forum 
that can balance both scientific and political climate-related concerns.327 
Corporatizing climate litigation, therefore, has expository value. It lays bare the 
previously secreted role of carbon-major corporations and relates it to the human 
pain and suffering, as well as financial costs caused by climate-induced extreme 
events. It also exposes the persistent refusal by the most regressive corporations to 
act in a societally responsible manner. Many of these corporations have pursued a 
self-fulfilling prophecy; the absence of regulation would ensure that fossil fuels 
would be a good investment and that corporations would, therefore, maximize their 
profits to the detriment of the world.328 As Fromhoff, Heede, and Oreskes note, many 
carbon-major corporations “are actively creating the future that they claim to accept 
the need to avoid.”329 The public narrative told in these cases is important, and 
provides a public forum for “an understanding of social and factual issues [to be] 
co-produced and settled.”330 The corollary of this understanding is the proposition 
that these corporations are also well placed in terms of their capacities in access to 
political power, wealth, technological advancement, and expertise to lead the 
transition to clean, safer energy.331 
Having shed their previous reluctance to engage with climate science, judicial 
actors now recognize the important role that new scientific disciplines play in the 
arena of tort law. New scientific processes could also provide progressive judges 
with the opportunity to rethink older interpretations of legal and evidentiary 
thresholds around tort, burdens of proof and causation, as well as obligations under 
corporate law.332 This second wave of climate litigation demonstrates an evolving 
global conversation between courts, government actors, private victims, tortfeasors, 
directors, and investors in the context of climate change.333 As the negative impacts 
of climate change increase, the global responses are likely to increase in a 
corresponding fashion. 
While political will in the United States may still be lacking at the federal level, 
state-based actions have gained traction.334 Federal resistance may also wane as the 
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impacts of climate change become more severe and apparent, more information is 
forthcoming due to improved climate science and corporate disclosures, and carbon-
majors begin to spend less money opposing the science on climate change. State and 
local actions can also increase the costs of operating for carbon-majors through 
increased regulation and permitting processes and enhanced incentives for clean 
energy. New scientific processes give climate-focused political groups new tools to 
target these companies and increase public pressure. As a result, anti-carbon-major 
movements may grow, implicating directors and requiring that they respond to social 
media and other public campaigns. 
As a public forum to highlight the importance of climate science, courts can 
also act as drivers of public and private sector action on climate change, even if the 
cases themselves are unsuccessful.335 As Ganguly et al. note, these cases could be 
“sublime failures,” achieving the aims of the litigants without achieving judicial 
success.336 The simple act of adjudicating climate change can help to shape the 
norms and beliefs of the broader public about the importance of climate change, and 
the contributory role and responsibilities of carbon-major companies.337 These cases 
highlight the importance of the evolving nature of climate risk, even if no damages 
or liability awards are ever made.  
The public attention these cases garner should capture the attention of 
responsible directors, as these litigation trends may lead to shifting social norms and 
political contexts. While it is unclear what the causal relationship is between 
litigation and strengthened climate governance, enhanced regulatory obligations are 
certainly emerging.338 Common standards on disclosure are likely to become global 
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industry norms, and therefore will affect the nature of what information directors 
should both consider and disclose to their shareholders.339 Disclosure obligations 
will put the issue of climate change directly on the agendas of AGMs, becoming an 
increasing concern for shareholders and, therefore, directors. The impacts of climate 
change are costly to corporations, and the bidirectional risk metrics of climate 
change should now necessarily inform directorial duties, significantly boosting the 
potential contribution of private law to resolving the climate crisis. 
 
B.  Connecting Litigation with Directors’ Duties 
 
Legal obligations for corporations in the context of climate change are already 
slowly transitioning towards greater liability.340 At the very least, the materiality and 
risk thresholds for disclosure and fiduciary considerations for directors are 
increasing. The Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) has 
issued guidance to assist investors in assessing both the transition plans of the 
companies in which they have invested and potential changes in the value of 
underlying assets due to climate change.341 If investors perceive increased risks of 
climate change to companies, they are likely to push for increased disclosure by 
directors and continue to put pressure on directors to address these risks. Directors 
may also be under pressure to disclose private governance risks from their emissions, 
including reputational risks, supply chain risks, increased customer and investor 
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demands, and financial risks.342 Attorneys may also be at risk of ethics rules 
violations if their clients fail to disclose the risks of climate change.343  
As impacts and risks materialize more clearly, litigation is likely to increase 
and take even more varied forms. Already, industries such as the fishing industry 
have started suing carbon-majors for harm from climate change.344 Banks and 
international financial institutions are moving away from financing fossil-fuel 
intensive activities and industries,345 and if financial institutions become the target 
of litigation, carbon-majors could encounter difficulties finding financing for future 
activities. Litigation imposes both direct costs on companies of settlements and 
attorneys’ fees, but also indirect costs such as investor uncertainty about firm 
prospects, loss of customers, suppliers and prestige, and a diversion of management 
time and resources.346 Litigation can also affect credit ratings, the cost of debt, and 
other financing costs.347 Litigation “will progress as the threat of runaway climate 
change materialises” more clearly, and courts are likely to “step in and interpret the 
law in a way that meets society’s most urgent demands.”348 However, it should be 
noted in the U.S. context that President Trump’s most enduring legacy will be the 
appointment of conservative judges.349 These judicial appointments may provide a 
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dampening effect on climate litigation trends, and any successful district court cases 
may have a short shelf life. 
Despite this judicial dampening potential, this Article has demonstrated that a 
shift is emerging in the context of litigation launched against carbon-major 
corporations, with judges engaging more closely with new climate science 
processes, litigants becoming more creative, and, consequentially, raising public 
consciousness of climate change. This litigation shift is putting direct pressure on 
directors’ duties by highlighting the risks of climate change to corporations and is 
likely to have several impacts. It will directly affect the procedural elements of 
directors’ duties by raising the profile of climate risk and the role and contribution 
of carbon-major corporations to climate risk, and by triggering a legal obligation to 
both consider and incorporate this information into their decision-making processes.  
Litigation may also have more indirect effects by influencing the content of 
directors’ decisions if directors take a long-term perspective. The open-textured 
nature of directors’ duties allows directors to react to evolving risks and industry 
norms. Directors are supposed to be informed and responsible actors, and the 
increased profile of climate change risk can no longer be ignored by directors of 
corporations that are highly vulnerable to climate risks.  
Whether or not tort law adapts to climate change or these cases are successful, 
climate change triggers the application of fiduciary duties by the sheer scale of the 
risk it poses to businesses. In many instances, climate change is leading to an 
adaptation of legal orders and legal reasoning,350 and this will continue to be the case 
in the area of corporate law. While corporate law was historically insulated from 
environmental concerns, the risks of climate change are becoming so great that 
directors can no longer afford to ignore them, or not to pass on risk-based 
information to their shareholders. As a result, private law may contribute to better 
and more informed climate-decision making by directors and investors on climate 
change.  
Short-term profit-making has traditionally been the sole focus of many 
directors, and in this vein, directors may be reluctant to make long term transition 
decisions if short-term costs are incurred due to a short-term approach to shareholder 
wealth maximization. As a result, market forces may continue to exert adverse 
pressure on directors’ decision making.351 But shareholder wealth maximization 
does not require a short-term approach, and directors should pay attention to climate 
change not just because of the increasing risks of climate litigation, but because 
climate-induced risks and damages are occurring now and are only expected to 
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worsen over time, and so it makes good long-term sense for their shareholders.352 
Overcoming short-term thinking will be critical for directors to take action on 
climate change. 
The corporate trend in climate litigation has other, perhaps more indirect, 
implications for directors. While concrete legal obligations for corporations may be 
in their infant stages, Flynn notes that, even if litigation suits are unsuccessful, they 
can persuade corporations to shift assets to more sustainable sources, put pressure 
on them to lobby legislatures to develop comprehensive climate change legislation, 
and also keep the issue of climate change alive in the public consciousness.353 Private 
law could ultimately lead directors to decide to divest assets away from fossil fuels 
and re-allocate assets into cleaner energy sources if they use tools available to them. 
 
C.  Climate-Based Management Tools and Strategies 
 
While directors may feel overwhelmed by the complexity of climate change, 
there are existing steps they can and should take. They should use existing tools 
made available by the TCFD to assess the risks of climate change to their business, 
including direct and indirect risks. Directors should acquire a more detailed 
understanding of the impacts of climate change to broader society in order to 
understand and assess systemic risks, indirect risks, impacts on social welfare and 
consumption patterns, and the risks of non-linear impacts of climate change. They 
should also assess climate-related opportunities. 
Several factors impede directors from addressing climate-related risks and 
opportunities. These include competing priorities such as cybersecurity, the sheer 
complexity of climate change and its systemic nature, and short-term business cycles 
and risk assessments.354 While information and climate models are complex, 
industry guidance under the TCFD is providing more and more tools to directors and 
managers to incorporate climate change more appropriately to their business 
strategies. One of these tools is scenario analysis.355 This tool allows directors to 
create scenarios to predict the impact of climate change on their existing and future 
profitability models. Directors should adopt scenario analysis approaches and 
industry-specific guidance provided by the TCFD. While there will be some 
temporal dissonances between the long time scales of climate change and the shorter 
profit horizons of corporations, scenario analysis provided by the TCFD can help 
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directors to manage this dissonance, and craft corporate strategies to better cater for 
a variety of time scales which are relevant to their businesses.356 Climate impacts 
should no longer be considered as only long-term risks. Climate impacts are 
happening now, and directors should assess short-, medium- and long-term impacts. 
Directors should also gain a better understanding of the contributions of their 
businesses to climate impacts and employ scenario analysis to assess their predicted 
emissions against global temperature goals. Carbon-major companies, in particular, 
should assess increasing litigation and other transition risks, including in the realm 
of securities and corporate law, as well as physical risks to their assets, including 
potentially stranded assets. These risks should be disclosed to investors, following 
TCFD guidelines.  
In addition, the acquisition of knowledge cannot remain static as the accuracy 
of the science of climate change and assessment of its impacts increases. Increasing 
disclosure requirements also mean that directors should implement appropriate 
reporting and information systems, which are kept up to date as the science and 
impacts of climate change improve and increase. Failure to monitor and disclose 
risks appropriately to shareholders may violate the duty of loyalty and could also 
attract litigation from investors. Litigation claims are likely to arise when fiduciary 
actors fail to share and disclosure relevant information and risks to shareholders or 
fail to take adaptive actions based on their knowledge.357 Litigation aside, investors 
are increasingly expecting boards to have fluency with “climate-related risks and 
opportunities.”358 As stated above, directors’ duties are open-textured and as a result 
do not remain static. The content and requirements of these duties will change as 
scientific knowledge about the risks of climate change evolves. 
Finally, directors should assess the profitability and feasibility of energy 
transitions away from fossil fuels. They should look at both mitigation and 
adaptation actions beyond incrementalistic action and consider transformational 
actions and the opportunities and reduction of risks they hold. 
Directors of all corporations should become aware of the relevance of climate 
change to their businesses, and this may involve hiring experts on the board to 
achieve this. As the impacts of climate change are only predicted to worsen in the 
coming decades, directors must have a clearer understanding of the specific risks 
from climate change to their businesses and investigate and prepare for 
transformational approaches to climate risk and climate change. This requires that 
directors take longer-term perspectives but also a phased approach. In order to do 
this, directors need to develop the ability to manage and understand the large time 
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scales and complex information on climate change. New research is emerging, 
which clearly points to the business case for transition, even for carbon-major 
corporations.359 Directors should now be both fully aware of the risks that climate 
change poses to their business and the opportunities available to them for cleaner 
alternative energy production. Directors will need guidance and expertise to do this, 
as well as long-term thinking. 
Fiduciary duties provide directors with sufficient flexibility to take on the 
challenge of climate change.360 However, barriers remain. While the second climate 
litigation wave is ostensive, corporate group structures could pose a further barrier 
to success against parent companies.361 If litigants and regulators cannot reach the 
parent companies, the scope of the second wave’s impact may be diminished. The 
interstate nature of emissions may also prove problematic. A myopic focus on short-
term profitability also poses significant barriers to climate action. Even if this second 
wave of corporate climate litigation is largely unsuccessful, increased climate risk 
combined with shifting industry norms should lead responsible directors to both 
cater to and carefully consider the risks climate change poses to their businesses and 
shareholder interests.  
While climate litigation serves useful purposes as outlined above, other 
regulatory changes and fiscal incentives are required, as corporate law alone cannot 
tackle the enormous challenges of climate change. But increased climate risks and 
impacts also increases public awareness, which is likely to spur on regulatory action. 
Directors should consider these shifts and their implications for their businesses. 
This Article concludes that while a variety of regulatory and fiscal developments are 
needed to provide a more comprehensive approach to climate change, existing 
fiduciary duties guided by shareholder wealth maximization norms provide 




The world is facing a climate crisis. Global temperatures are increasing more 
rapidly than even once expected and, if emissions remain unabated, we could see 
global average temperatures rise by 4ºC (or higher) by the end of the century, and 
we have very little time to correct course.362 Crises can and do have impacts on 
corporate law. While corporate law remains largely a default set of rules and laws 
with few mandatory requirements relating to climate change, regulatory changes are 
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often inspired by crises.363 Social and political regimes are reacting to the climate 
crisis. Regulatory and fiscal restraints on carbon are starting to emerge, and litigation 
against corporations on climate change is escalating and only likely to increase in 
the future. While still in their infancy, these changes and movements could be seen 
as the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel economy and could herald in a global 
transition towards a lower-carbon economy.  
Irrespective of the outcomes of existing cases, this new spate of corporate 
climate litigation serves a different and perhaps more lasting purpose – it highlights 
and publicizes the risks of climate change to directors, investors, and the public. 
Directors must take into account increased climate risks when making business 
decisions. Existing litigation and regulatory efforts are by no means sufficient, and 
larger and broader fiscal instruments and regulatory policies will be needed to usher 
in a uniform and swift energy transition. At the same time, markets and, therefore, 
corporations are not accurately considering the risks of climate change, or of 
transitions away from fossil fuels. Directors should consider and assess escalating 
climate risks to their business and should disclose these risks to shareholders where 
they are material. Fiduciary duties provide them with sufficient flexibility to take 
action on climate change in the interests of their shareholders. Corporate law, along 
with new industry guidance and tools, provides directors with the strategies they 
require to address the climate crisis. It is in the best interests of shareholders, but 
also the public at large, that directors harness the power of corporations to tackle the 
climate crisis head-on, before it is too late. 
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